Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 3

2008

Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the
Alternative Investment Market
Jose M. Mendoza

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jose M. Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the Alternative
Investment Market, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 257 (2008).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol13/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SECURITIES REGULATION IN LOW-TIER
LISTING VENUES: THE RISE OF THE
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET
Jose Miguel Mendoza*

*Research Fellow, TILEC-AFM Network on Financial Market Regulation; Professor,
International Business Law, Sabana University; and Lecturer, Corporate Law, Javeriana
University. The author would like to thank Professors Erik P.M. Vermeulen and Joseph
A. McCahery for their valuable insight during the course of this research.

257

258

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, participants in the world’s capital markets
witnessed a shift in the tide of international listings. As the U.S.
financial market rapidly loses its standing as the center of the global
economy, other countries eagerly rise to challenge its dominance. In the
aftermath of the Enron collapse and the “dot com” bubble burst,
investors and other market participants are turning away from the
regulatory burden imposed by the rigorous U.S. securities framework.
While some favor delisting, 1 others seek jurisdictions with less stringent
regulation in which the costs of being a public company are
comparatively lower. 2 By reducing the cost of listing and remaining
listed, this trend allows systems that feature lighter levels of regulation
and specialized market segments to thrive. These events might well be
considered symptoms of global regulatory competition among securities
regulators and stock exchanges. 3
The worldwide growth of competing trading fora and a stirring
movement for reform in the U.S. have given new life to an old debate
concerning the proper degree of regulatory stringency for financial
markets. Ascertaining the level of securities regulation that will prove
most effective in increasing overall social welfare is not an easy task. A
straightforward cost-benefit examination might be insufficient to solve
this problem, since it is difficult to quantify the economic effects of
1. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Has New York
Become Less Competitive in Global Markets?: Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices
Over Time 1 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-03-012,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982193.
2. See id.
3. See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter
Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525
(2005); Merrit B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
is Not Investor Empowerment (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 99-008,
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=155928 [hereinafter Fox, Mandatory
Disclosure]; Merrit B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 01-007, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285294
[hereinafter Fox, Issuer Choice]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in
International Securities Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Yale Int’l Ctr. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 00-49, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728
[hereinafter Romano, Competition]. This literature represents a sampling of the
extensive scholarship produced in the field of global regulatory competition in the
securities markets, particularly with respect to the “Issuer Choice Debate.”
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securities regulation. 4 In any case, an optimal securities framework
should strike a balance between investor protection and compliance
costs for listed companies. 5 The tension lies in introducing proper
measures to attain such a balance, while still allowing for the
development of a deep and liquid capital market. For instance, even if
prophylactic regulation boosts investor confidence in the market,
thereby enhancing liquidity, such rules can increase the costs of equity
issuances beyond reasonable boundaries. 6 This situation could induce
public companies to de-list or to seek alternative listing venues. 7 Yet,
lighter levels of regulation could lead to market failures, eroding
investor confidence to a point in which liquidity is constrained and a
crash ensues. 8
Two moments in U.S. capital market history provide further insight.
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 9 (“SOX”) is often criticized for
increasing listing costs in the U.S. 10 SOX was merely the product of a
4. See John C. Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007) (stating that it is hard to weigh the costs and benefits of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Nevertheless, the increasing convergence of securities laws and
listing rules across jurisdictions point to some underlying compromise as to the
minimum regulatory burden that must be imposed on public companies in order to
protect the market. See id.
5. See Adam C. Pritchard, Self-regulation and Securities Markets (Georgetown
Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 318939, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=318939.
6. See Romano, Competition, supra note 3. The cost of raising capital is lowered
if investor confidence, as a result of stringent disclosure standards, is high. See id.; see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement (Columbia
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 304, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=967
482 [hereinafter Coffee, Enforcement].
7. Cf. Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 19 (arguing that “although [offering]
‘lighter’ regulation may not improve [a] cross-listing firm’s cost of capital, it could still
attract foreign issuers by offering heightened liquidity and visibility without impeding
their controlling shareholders’ enjoyment of private benefits”).
8. See Diana B. Henriques, Back from the Brink; The Fear That Made the Fed
Step In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, § 3, at 13 (discussing opposing views of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York’s arrangement of a rescue fund by Wall Street banks to
prevent a hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, from defaulting). Independent
market strategist Henry Kaufman claims that when “regulatory infrastructure is not
strong enough or encompassing enough” there is “a better-than-even chance” of “future
significant financial problems” in securities markets. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
10. Doidge et al., supra note 1 (stating that despite greater costs, unique benefits
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legislative reaction following a market crash, however, which brings to
mind the response to the 1929 collapse that prompted the U.S. Congress
to pass the Securities Act of 1933 11 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 12
Although the 1930’s measures and minor subsequent
amendments significantly raised listing costs, they created a framework
in which the U.S. market flourished for several decades. 13 Scholars
argue that despite its higher costs, SOX’s dissuasive effect on fraudulent
behavior will generate net long-term benefits. 14 Moreover, well-known
regulatory figures, like former Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) chairman Arthur Levitt, call for the implementation of still
stronger measures in the United States. 15
Nevertheless, proponents of a lighter approach to securities
regulation abound in the U.S. and abroad. 16 As companies flee from the
burden of U.S. regulation, policy-makers and scholars argue for an
alleviation of local regulatory requirements for listed companies. The
Report of the Committee on Capital Market Regulation (informally
dubbed the “Paulson Report,” after U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson) set the tone for reform by pointing out the erosive effect of
regulatory intensity on U.S. dominance and competitiveness. 17 The
garnered by listing in the U.S. have not been eroded by SOX).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2006).
12. Id. §§ 78a et seq.
13. See ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN CORPORATION:
CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE CONTROL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 222 (2006).
The cost of this regulation was considerable, and much objected by the participants.
One consequence, however, was that in time, public confidence in banking and
financial markets was not only restored but enhanced, and public participation in
those markets expanded well beyond levels that might have been imagined at the time
the regulations were adopted.

Id.
14. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Conference on the Rise and
Effectiveness of New Corporate Governance Standards (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch449.htm (stating, in regard to new SEC rules
increasing committee disclosure requirements, “A more globally integrated and
interconnected marketplace is upon us. The need for vigilant oversight has become
nothing less than a new global directive.”); see Coates, supra note 4, at 107.
15. Neil Weinberg, Levitt Loves Sarb-Ox, FORBES.COM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/02/07/levitt-sec-sarbox-bizcz_nw_0207levitt.html.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See COMM. ON CAP. MKT. REG., INTERIM REP. (Nov. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html (recommending amendments to regulatory
legislation, changes to litigation procedure, and adjustments regarding the
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publication of the Paulson Report was followed by a study conducted by
the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st
Century. 18 The argument of this more recent report hinges on a
comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. securities framework, focusing on
the federal government’s regulatory approach to financial markets and
the SEC’s powers regarding SOX. 19 A decline in U.S. market
hegemony can be seen in developments like the launching of OTCQX, a
listing service whose structure closely resembles London’s more lightlyregulated Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”). 20
This Article suggests an alternative model to the one-size-fits-all
approach that prevails in U.S. securities regulation. A broad approach
might prove inadequate when tested in a global market, encompassing
jurisdictions with differing characteristics (e.g., the technical
sophistication of investors) or when applied to firms with heterogeneous
incentive structures (e.g., family firms, large conglomerates). 21 Market
venues with different levels of regulatory intensity can accommodate the
needs of various types of firms and investors, without sacrificing market
integrity. 22 A segment with stringent rules and enhanced disclosure
requirements would be located at one end of the spectrum. The other
end would feature a segment with less onerous regulation, providing
access to liquidity pools for small-cap companies that require funds for
further expansion, or family firms that favor listing but intend to retain

implementation of section 404 of SOX).
18. See CapitalMarketsCommission.com, http://www.capitalmarketscommission.co
m/portal/capmarkets/default (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). The Commission on the
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century was formed by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce as an independent group of experts. Its mission is to preserve
and strengthen U.S. capital markets by evaluating U.S. legal and regulatory framework
and suggesting amendments to the current system. Id.
19. See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REP. AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.c
om/portal/capmarkets/default.htm (follow link to “Download Full Report”).
20. See OTCQX Brochure, http://www.otcqx.com/otcqx/docs/OTCQXBrochure.p
df (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). The newly-formed service for over-the-counter trading
features reduced regulatory requirements and a counselling party (the Designated
Adviser for Disclosure), not unlike AIM’s “Nominated Adviser.”
21. See infra Part II.A.
22i See infra Part II. Stock exchanges indeed appear to be introducing specialized
segments for different types of firms. Coffee notes that the increased specialization of
stock exchanges is a direct consequence of competitive pressures building up among
such entities. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18.
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some of the benefits of private control. 23 A low-tier market segment,
not subject to a plethora of costly rules, could be used as a stepping
stone for companies that purport to engage in future issuances in
primary markets like the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”), the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”),
or the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). 24
AIM, conceived by the LSE, embodies this novel approach to
securities regulation. While the LSE’s less stringent approach draws the
attention of many large companies, AIM attracts the attention of small
and mid-cap companies. 25 In order to elude mandatory regulation, such
as the European Union Directives, that increases transaction costs for
listed firms, trading venues such as AIM are classified as exchangeregulated markets. 26 AIM’s model relies heavily on lower listing
standards and lighter ongoing requirements for listed companies, paired
with the so-called “Nominated Adviser,” a private consultant that guides
firms through their existence as listed companies. 27 This alternative
approach propelled AIM’s rise as one of the world’s fastest growing
exchanges, as measured by the number of initial public offerings
(“IPOs”). 28
23. See Chris Gibson-Smith, Chairman, London Stock Exch., Address at the Risk
Capital Summit: AIM for Europe (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.londonstockex
change.com/en-gb/about/Newsroom/Media+Resources/Speeches/aimforeurope.htm.
This segment might also prove to be an adequate exit venue for venture capital
investors. The European Venture Capital Association, for instance, has shown interest
in developing a pan-European market with lighter regulation for smaller firms. Id.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See First Columbus Invs., About AIM/AIM Statistics and Facts,
http://www.first-columbus.com/aim_stats.shtml#para10 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
26. Chris Blackhurst, Cheap Trick, CNBC EUR. BUS., Jan. 1, 2006, available at
http://cnbceb.com/2006/01/01/cheaptrick.
27. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM THE MOST SUCCESSFUL GROWTH MARKET IN
THE WORLD 3 (2008), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres
/3B5EDCF9-1E01-4B7C-A31A-95B7170675B9/0/LSEAIMBROCHURE_WEB.pdf
(discussing AIM’s advantages, including “appropriate” regulation for smaller
companies, and the Nominated Advisor’s role in taking “responsibility for co-ordinating
(sic) the admission process” and carrying out “extensive due diligence to ensure the
company is suitable for AIM”).
28. See Press Release, London Stock Exch., AIM Study Identifies Keys to
Market’s Success (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
NR/exeres/6B9D495B-26D4-42D6-9067-31ACC74C8F3A.htm (“[S]ince 1995 some
2,300 British and 400 foreign companies have come to AIM, raising a total of £49
billion, of which over 40 per cent has been in the form of further issues [and
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AIM’s thriving success led to an outbreak of similar trading venues
across Europe. 29 The Borsa Italiana sponsored the creation of Mercato
Expandi in December 2003; 30 the Irish Enterprise Exchange was created
in April 2005; 31 Euronext quickly followed suit, launching the Alternext
venue. 32 Even the Deutsche Börse emulates AIM with its “Entry
Standard” segment, launched in October 2005. 33 When the Nordic
OMX introduced its First North tier, commentators proclaimed the start
of a price war that could lead European securities markets into a
regulatory race to the bottom. 34 Adding to this wariness, the disastrous
European experience with the now extinct “New Markets” still looms in
the mind of policymakers and investors alike. 35 Despite this ominous
forecast, European low-cost market segments continue to flourish, even
altering the course of international cross-listings. 36
This Article focuses on AIM’s regulatory model in order to explain
the recent success of low-cost listing venues in international financial
markets. Part I explains how AIM covers a funding gap for companies
whose specific characteristics preclude them from listing in senior
markets such as NASDAQ, the NYSE, or the LSE. In addition, it states
that AIM’s level of regulation is close to optimal—imposing low costs
on firms but ensuring sufficient disclosure and transparency—given the
type of companies that seek an AIM listing and the nature of its investor
approximately 60 per cent of the AIM’s issuances were IPO’s].”); Sridhar Arcot et al.,
The London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., From Local to Global – The Rise of AIM as a
Stock Market for Growing Companies, available at http://www.londonstockexchange.c
om/NR/rdonlyres/4B0DF62A-BE1E-44F5-8616-EA2891873F1D/0/AIMshortreport.pd
f; see also First Columbus Invs., supra note 25 (providing general AIM statistics).
29. Blackhurst, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. “Segment” refers to a target group of listing companies, in this case small
to mid-size companies, which must weigh the advantages of Deutsche Börse’s Entry
Standard against the London Stock Exchange’s AIM to determine where to list their
shares. See id.
34. Id.
35. See Marc Goergen et al., The Rise and Fall of the European New Markets: On
the Short and Long-run Performance of High-tech Initial Public Offerings (Eur. Corp.
Gov. Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 27, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=443
861 (providing a detailed account of the rise and fall of the European New Markets).
36. See Joseph Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow
of International Listings (Jan. 2007) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987.
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base. Part II traces the evolution of a regulatory dynamic that gave rise
to the existing cost/benefit structure of stock exchanges. Part III
analyzes AIM’s regulatory model in an attempt to explain its recent
success and its adequacy as a listing venue for certain types of firms.
Part IV concludes that AIM’s model is a legitimate success, although
remaining flaws must be corrected for the platform to continue to be
favored by small, high-growth firms.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Financial markets have come a long way since Adam Smith
espoused the free allocation of economic resources in market systems
and the all-too-familiar invisible hand more than two centuries ago.37
Without neglecting the principle of laissez-faire that allowed
sophisticated economies to prosper, regulators and policy-makers in
advanced jurisdictions discovered long ago that some intervention was
necessary if financial markets were to function properly. 38 Although the
level of governmental intervention varies across jurisdictions, existing
rules and statutes focus primarily on the importance of timely and
accurate disclosure of relevant information to the market and corporate
governance structures. 39
It is a fundamental tenet of capital markets that an adequate flow of
high-quality information enhances investor confidence and, thus,
contributes to the development of deep and liquid financial markets. 40
Enhanced transparency might not only allow for timely, extensive
information, but can also improve and homogenize the quality of the
data disclosed. Standardized information enables investors to compare
different business prospects. If investors possess a greater degree of
37.
38.

See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 221.
See id. at 220. Political considerations play a large role concerning
governmental intervention in market systems. Id. at 222. As Smith and Walter point
out, a democratic society is sometimes at odds with a totally free market system, in
which some parties sustain heavy losses at the expense of others. Id. at 223.
Consequently, legislators with political incentives often strive to transfer wealth from
“the richer to the poorer members of a democratic society, as a measure of moral
justice.” Id. at 224. This is accomplished by progressive taxing and the introduction of
measures that reduce freedom in the market. Id. at 223-24.
39. See id. at 272.
40. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the Inter-American Development
Bank: The Importance of High Quality Accounting Standards (Sept. 29, 1997),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch176.txt.
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standardized, high-quality information, they may be more inclined to
invest in securities markets. Disclosure is frequently coupled with
corporate governance mechanisms that attempt to neutralize agency
problems in listed firms. 41 A balanced mix of properly enforced
disclosure requirements and corporate governance rules is a telltale sign
of a jurisdiction with a sophisticated capital market. 42
Successive financial collapses have led policymakers to focus on
disclosure 43 and corporate governance, 44 by introducing and enforcing
rules aimed at providing an adequate level of investor protection. This
regulatory dynamic, in which market crashes are followed by legislative
and policy responses, still determines the aims and stringency level of
securities laws in multiple jurisdictions. 45
Market complexities,
however, make it extremely difficult to introduce such corrective
41. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 21, 21-31 (2004). Agency problems can affect the relations that exist
between (i) majority and minority shareholders, (ii) shareholders and management, and
(iii) the firm and other constituencies. Id.
42. See generally Francisco Reyes, Corporate Governance in Latin America: A
Functional Analysis (2007) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005208.
43. The debate regarding the importance of mandatory disclosure mainly concerns
informational efficiency in the market, such as reducing the information gap that exists
between public companies and investors. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and
What Can Law Do About It? (2000) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=183473. According to Partnoy, most authors agree that
securities regulation should focus mainly on mandatory disclosure. See id. at 21; see
also Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market (Wayne State Univ.
Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964704; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6; Romano,
Competition, supra note 3; Fox, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3.
44. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism 43 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law Working Paper No. 23, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=606481. In the midst of the Great Depression in
the U.S., Associate Justice William O. Douglas identified the insufficiency of disclosure
requirements in preventing market failures and advocated corporate governance reform.
In Douglas’ opinion, preventing a collapse similar to the one that led to the Depression
in the 1930s would require regulation concerning the separation of ownership and
control. His proposal consisted mainly of a monitoring model in which independent
directors would oversee management. Bratton and McCahery explain that “Douglas’
article set out the basic terms of the governance agenda that has guided corporate law
reform ever since.” Id.
45. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 222.
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measures ex ante to prevent the market from collapsing. 46 Securities
laws could thus largely be considered a regulatory response to market
failures. Analyzing this interaction between policymakers and the
market is central to understanding the role of securities regulation in
ensuring a healthy marketplace.
A. A Regulatory Dynamic
The rules set out in advanced economic systems are often the result
of a continuous regulatory dynamic in which market flaws are detected
and fixed ex post. 47 Most major interventions in the world’s financial
systems are the result of a market collapse, often preceded by the burst
of speculative bubbles and corporate scandals. 48 Early examples of this
trend include the failure of the Mississippi and South Sea Companies in
the eighteenth century, which led to significant investor losses, general
public outrage, and ensuing governmental intervention. The stories
behind both scandals are well known. After the French and English
governments, respectively, granted monopolistic positions to each
company, public investors poured funds into these ventures. In each
case information was manipulated or concealed from the market and a
harmful speculative bubble was quick to inflate and burst, leading to
massive losses for the unwary investors of both companies. 49 The
46.
47.

See Partnoy, supra note 43, at 3.
See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation: 300 Hundred
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/WU
LR/75-2/752-5.html; John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the
U.S. and Europe Differ (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 274, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 [hereinafter Coffee, Scandals].
48. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms 5 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 237,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=447940 [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper].
This crash-then-law sequence has repeated itself multiple times over the course of
several centuries “with financial regulation following largely as a response to market
crashes.” See Partnoy, supra note 43, at 3.
49. See Joseph McCahery & Erik Vermeulen, Corporate Governance and
Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Family Businesses (Eur. Corp. Gov.
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 65, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894785.
In the case of the South Sea Company, for instance, crucial information regarding the
Spanish dominion of key New World territories was concealed from the public. See id.
at 11. “The South Sea Company was in fact nothing more than an empty shell without
any future cash flows and expectations.” Id. The South Sea Company endured an 80%
loss in the value of its shares in the period leading to its collapse. Partnoy, supra note
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upshot of these debacles was not only swift governmental action, but
also a general loss of confidence in the corporate form, which persisted
until the Industrial Revolution. 50
In the United States, the regulatory dynamic in securities regulation
has been far more visible than in other jurisdictions. Following the
devastation of the First World War in Europe, the U.S. emerged as the
leading center for financial services. Unrestrained market activity
characterized the 1920s era, in which high returns were often the result
of speculation and market manipulation. 51 In 1929, the speculative
bubble finally ruptured, throwing the U.S. economy into a period of
economic decline, aptly termed the Great Depression. Public discontent
eventually led to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
implementation of his New Deal policies, which sought to reactivate the
economy and restore public confidence in the market. 52 The Securities
Act of 1933 53 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 54 served as
cornerstones of his policy agenda and were swiftly approved by
Congress. 55 These measures significantly raised the costs of being a
listed company in the U.S. 56 Despite raising compliance costs,
governmental intervention (including the passage of both acts)
succeeded in restoring public confidence and allowed financial markets
to flourish. Although corporate scandals and minor market crashes
occurred during the ensuing decades, the United States enjoyed a period

43, at 8.
50. See David Sanders, Financial Catastrophes: The Overthrow of Modern
Financial
Theory
(Oct.
2003)
(unpublished
working
paper),
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/files/pdf/proceedings/giro2003/Sanders.pdf.
Historical
records concerning the South Sea bubble crash point to Robert Walpole as leading an
investigation, which ultimately resulted in the introduction of several measures to
increase public confidence. See id. app. 1.
51. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 58.
52. See id. During this period “lost market values, bankruptcies and scandals led to
cries for punishment of the ‘guilty’ and improved regulation to prevent future
recurrences. The 1929 crash was a watershed event because it was seen at the time as
the cause of the ruinous economy that followed a decade of prosperity.” Id. at 7.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2006).
54. Id. 78a et seq.
55. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 7-8.
56. See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS (3d ed. 2005) (giving a detailed explanation of such measures).
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of relative stability that was to last until the end of the twentieth
century. 57
After the vibrant takeover wave of the 1980s, the U.S. economy
entered a high-growth period in which market conditions were optimal
for the economic expansion of the following decade. As high-tech startup firms started to dominate the marketplace, investors and gatekeepers
alike were caught in a wave of irrational exuberance that would
ultimately lead to a market collapse of vast dimensions. 58 The bull
market of the 1990s saw stock indices rise to unprecedented levels,
peaking in 2000: the NASDAQ Composite Index reached 5,048, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average rose to 11,722, and the S&P 500 peaked
at 1,527. Despite the buoyant expansion of this decade, the problems
that foreshadowed the passage of SOX soon became evident. As the
1990s economy slowed, the high overvaluation of tech-related stocks,
largely fuelled by market euphoria, negatively affected investors in
equity markets. 59
Widespread gatekeeper failure accompanying
notorious fraud scandals at some of the largest U.S. companies 60 and
public anxiety following terrorist attacks on New York played a large
part in shifting public opinion against regulatory laxity. 61 Federal
intervention was swift. 62
After Enron’s stock plummeted amid

57. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 8 (recording the existence of a bubble
burst in 1958, which was followed by minor intervention embodied by the passage of
the Williams Act, and another crash in 1987, which only gave rise to reforms by stock
exchanges).
58. See id. at 10-12.
59. Edwin J. Perkins, Book Review, 6 OXFORD J. ENTER. & SOC’Y 557, 557-58
(2005) (reviewing ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE
AND ITS UNDOING (Penguin 2004)).
60. See Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48, at 5.
61. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 46-47 (arguing that the
combination of three elements led to the passage of SOX—“a major and ongoing
decline in the equity markets . . . headline-grabbing stories of corporate corruption and
popular anger towards corporate management”—and pointing out that these same
ingredients were also instrumental in the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act during the 1970s); see also supra notes 11-13 (explaining responses to the 1929
market crash and how the economy flourished thereafter).
62. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 7-8 (asserting that a general loss of
confidence in the U.S. financial market, a loss of market capitalization estimated at over
$8 trillion, and increasing public outrage are some of the factors that may have
prompted the federal government to intervene so rapidly).
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accounting scandals and paper-shredding rumors, and Worldcom
collapsed, the U.S. Congress raced to pass SOX. 63
Federal intervention again broke from the historical trend that each
state regulates the corporate affairs of its companies. 64 The newly
enacted SOX imposed stiff corporate governance requirements on
publicly-held corporations, particularly with regard to the company’s
auditing processes. 65 Scholars across the U.S. still argue whether the
costs imposed by raising governance hurdles are justified. 66
Specifically, the SOX debate turns on whether the Act reduced the cost
of capital in the U.S. more than it increased the regulatory burden for
publicly-held companies. 67

63. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 47. In their account of the SOX
enactment process, Bratton and McCahery explain that as the Senate held hearings on
the bill that would become SOX, Worldcom collapsed, leading to an accelerated
approval of the new law. Id.
64. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper 04-37, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101 [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley]; Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 44, at 35. The securities acts of the 1930s had also impinged on
states’ autonomy in corporate affairs. Even though such laws did not directly concern
company law matters, they clearly affected the way firms operated. The Securities Act
of 1933, although passed almost four years after the stock market crash of 1929, was the
result of hasty governmental intervention. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy
of the Securities Act of 1933 2 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Working Paper
No. 00-11, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=224729.
65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006).
As stated in the preamble to SOX, its purpose is “to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.”
Id. The Act is applicable to public firms incorporated in the U.S., public accounting
firms, any person or company involved in audit or reporting under U.S. law, and to
foreign firms that undergo public issuances in the U.S. See id. Some of the provisions
set out in SOX concern (i) the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, (ii) a requirement to set into place strong control structures and evaluate them
periodically, (iii) certifications by CEOs and CFOs of financial reports, (iv) completely
independent audit committees, and (v) a prohibition of personal loans to management.
See id.
66. See supra notes 43-44. A vast array of academic literature addresses the costs
and benefits structure of SOX and its impact on the U.S. market.
67. See Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, Should We Care About the Decline
in U.S. IPOs?, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/11/should_we_care_.html
(Nov. 25, 2006, 7:18 AM) (arguing that this valuation cannot be effectively undertaken
without the benefit of hindsight).
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While both sides offer compelling arguments for 68 and against 69 the
Act, recent reports, which single out the 2002 law as one of the main
reasons for the loss of competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets,
tend to bolster the argument of SOX’s opponents. 70 The Report of the
Committee on Capital Market Regulation, released on November 30,
2006, concluded that regulatory intensity set into place by SOX and
similar legislative efforts eroded U.S. dominance and competitiveness. 71
After carefully analyzing the current state of affairs in the U.S., the blueribbon Paulson Committee recommended amendments to securities
regulation and litigation, as well as adjustments regarding the
implementation of SOX section 404. 72 The publication of the Paulson
Report preceded a study conducted by the Commission on the
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century. This report
suggests a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. securities regulation,
centered on the federal government’s approach to financial markets, the
SEC’s powers regarding SOX, and the U.S. litigation framework. 73 A
third report sprung from a joint effort between New York City’s Mayor
Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles E. Schumer. 74
After

68. See, e.g., Robert J. Brown, Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack
Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006) (providing several counterarguments for the main critiques of SOX); Coates, supra note 4, at 92.
69. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, ABSTRACT TO THE
SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: HOW TO FIX IT AND WHAT WE’VE LEARNED 4 (2006)
(arguing that “[b]y imposing the costs of eliminating fraud on all firms in investors’
portfolios, the SOX mandates are a terrible deal for the ordinary investors it purports to
protect”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in
Leisure 15 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 06-14, 2006) (arguing
that “by raising the cost of access to the capital markets, SOX likely will slow down the
economy in the long-run”); Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the
Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 86 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he
current U.S. regulatory scheme makes cross-border investment costly and inefficient”);
Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 64, at 2-3.
70. Whether SOX erodes U.S. competitiveness is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is important to note that the U.S. securities framework, including the SOX
provisions, impose high costs on publicly-held firms. Smaller firms bear a
disproportionate part of such costs and will thus refrain from going public, seek
alternative listing venues, or de-list. See infra Part II.C.
71. See COMM. ON CAP. MKT. REG., supra note 17.
72. See id.
73. See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 19.
74. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW
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identifying several factors that have eroded New York’s leading
position, including the migration of IPO activity and strong dynamics
driving the growth of non-U.S. markets, the Bloomberg-Schumer report
calls for urgent action “at the national, State and City levels to enhance
the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets and defend New
York’s role as a global financial center.” 75 Lending further credence to
the three reports, a recent study displaced New York as the world’s top
financial services center, awarding London the highest ranking. 76
As the U.S. markets slowly adapted to SOX’s regulatory
framework, the European Union became immersed in a series of
corporate scandals of their own. Irregularities in high-profile European
firms such as Parmalat and Hollinger, however, stemmed from a
different source than the North American episodes. Whereas Enron,
Worldcom and similar cases concerned manipulation of financial
statements by management, Parmalat eventually collapsed after
controlling shareholders misappropriated company assets in an amount
close to $17 billion. 77
Disparities in the corporate governance systems of the United States
and Europe account for the methodological differences in both types of
fraudulent behavior. The dispersed shareholder model that prevails in
the U.S. and its equity-based system of executive compensation created
a set of incentives for managers to engage in financial manipulation in
order to maximize personal benefits. 78 The European concentrated
YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_
REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf. This report is also tough on SOX. Its preamble
categorically criticizes SOX for having eroded U.S. competitiveness: “The flawed
implementation of [SOX] which produced far heavier costs than expected, has only
aggravated the situation.” Id.
75. See id. at 29. An expert group commissioned to modernize securities
legislation in Canada recently found that SOX had a detrimental impact on U.S. capital
markets, to the extent that it was allegedly introduced without consideration of essential
market characteristics (e.g., the influence of gatekeepers, the effectiveness of private
enforcement, and the role of market forces). The report hinges on whether to introduce
reforms to the Canadian system that would bring it closer to the LSE’s and AIM’s level
of regulation than the one set forth by SOX. See JOHN BOARD ET AL., THE LSE’S AIM
MARKET: EFFECT ON RETURNS AND TRADING OF CANADIAN STOCKS (2006).
76. See Alan Beattie, London Named Top Financial Centre, FIN. TIMES, June 11,
2007 (showing London at the top position of the world’s top fifty financial centers, with
New York, Tokyo, and Chicago as runners-up).
77. See Coffee, Scandals, supra note 47, at 14.
78. See id. at 18. Upon receiving stock options as remuneration for their services,
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ownership model generated conditions under which controlling parties
were able to expropriate other constituencies. 79 Accordingly, the
Parmalat racket largely consisted of controlling shareholders siphoning
company assets through related party transactions. 80 However, financial
statement misrepresentations and other instances of fraud involving
European public firms had been uncovered even before the Milan Stock
Exchange suspended trading in Parmalat shares at the end of 2003. 81
The European Commission responded by introducing a series of
amendments, “including an Action Plan for the modernization of
company law and plans for the reform of the statutory audit.” 82
Ultimately, securities regulation will have net positive effects if it
reduces the cost of capital more than it raises regulatory costs for listed
companies in a given jurisdiction. 83 Regulatory costs, while varying in
nature, are often imposed without regard to a firm’s size or specific
managers had an incentive to tamper with a firm’s short-term profits, since better results
meant a higher payout derived from such options. Id. at 7.
79. See id. at 11-13 (explaining that the European model allows controlling parties
to expropriate the minority holders’ interests).
80. See id. at 14. After bond issuances for $150 million and $200 million in 2003,
Parmalat’s financial statements were subject to rigorous scrutiny. See Guido Alessandro
Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement:
The Parmalat Case 9 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law Working Paper No. 40, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730403.
Auditors
detected some irregularities concerning funds supposedly deposited in an offshore
account held by Bonlat, a Cayman Island subsidiary of Parmalat. See Ferrarini &
Giudici, supra. A governmental inquiry subsequently unveiled the truth—no such
account existed. Members of the company’s management had apparently forged a letter
from the Bank of America and manipulated financial statements for over a decade. See
Coffee, Scandals, supra note 47, at 14.
81. See Abe De Jong et al., Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance 13
(Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 67/2005, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=663504. Managers in the Dutch
Ahold company had overstated financial statements by consolidating amounts derived
from a 50-50 joint venture (which is not permitted under Dutch regulation unless the
consolidating company has effective control of the venture) and then tried to cover such
irregularities by misrepresenting control of the joint venture in a series of letters. Id.
Deceptive accounting in an Ahold U.S. subsidiary—U.S. Foodservices—was also
uncovered. See id. at 12-13.
82. See John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate
Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the U.S. 3 (Amsterdam Ctr.
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2006-07, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=910205.
83. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 70-71.
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incentive structure. 84 Accordingly, it is up to each firm to balance the
costs of listing against its benefits when deciding whether to go public. 85
If the introduction of strict auditing and disclosure rules raise listing
costs too high, a firm may seek other listing venues, alternative
financing mechanisms, or even undergo delisting procedures.86
However important this homogeneous cost structure is in ensuring
investor protection, it might also become a deterrent for small-cap
companies that cannot afford to endure such costs, or family firms that
could derive higher benefits from remaining unlisted. 87 It follows that
one-size-fits-all rules can have negative spillover effects vis-à-vis
84. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69 (arguing that SOX has a negative
overall impact on investors, since it includes the costs of eliminating fraud on all listed
firms—with some exceptions for foreign firms). In the authors’ opinion, investors will
profit from securities regulation only:
if the benefit from reduced fraud is greater than the cost of compliance by the firms
they invest in. . . . Moreover, it is well-accepted in the financial economics literature
that the costs and benefits of securities regulation should be evaluated from the
perspective of shareholders who can avoid some costs of fraud by investing in
diversified portfolios of shares.

Id. at 2.
85. See Amin N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141 passim (2003) [hereinafter Licht, Bonding]. Licht also
suggests that the listing decision may be a consequence of opportunistic behavior on
behalf of corporate insiders. In this scenario, such insiders would derive a higher direct
benefit than the firm. See id.
86. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Internal
Organization of Private Equity and Hedge Fund-oriented Governance, Maandblad voor
accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that “these funds not
only endeavour to deliver superior returns by diligent research and insightful analysis,
but also by actively reshaping a portfolio firm’s business policy and strategy”); William
W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 80, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928689 (explaining
some of the different strategies used by private equity and hedge funds in order to
maximize investment returns). The recent “going private” movement led by private
equity and hedge funds worldwide may be seen as a sign that the costs of being a listed
company in certain jurisdictions exceed its benefits. Private equity funds can obtain
high returns on their investment by lowering regulatory costs associated with disclosure
and compliance, implementing customized business policies, and then taking the
company public again. See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra.
87. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 50. SOX requirements in the U.S.
have been criticized for raising compliance costs more than compliance benefits for
certain types of firms. “In particular, the costs bear more heavily on a marginal class of
firms that will be discouraged from going public or, if already public, might be forced
to go private.” Id.
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smaller public firms, which are forced to bear a disproportionate part of
the regulatory costs of listing. 88 These firms are thus compelled to
operate under low or even negative profit margins, which could
eventually cause them to go private. 89 Accordingly, it might be possible
to specifically tailor cost structures to accommodate the needs of
different types of firms, while still ensuring an adequate level of
disclosure and investor protection. 90 Specialized rules can be a natural
outcome of increasing regulatory competition among stock exchanges.91
Even though some expect this competition to lead to convergence
around uniform rules, the most likely outcome is increased
specialization of listing venues. 92
88. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 2, 7, 43; see also ROBERT ABBANAT, EASDAQ,
S.A., FEASIBILITY STUDY: A PAN-EUROPEAN MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY GROWTH
COMPANIES 6-7 (2004), available at http://www.europabio.org/documents/MITFull.pdf; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 13-14, 42-43; Bainbridge, supra note
69, at 13.
SOX imposes high regulatory costs that place particular burdens on smaller publiclyheld companies. As a result, many firms are deciding not to go public, while a
substantial number of public firms are going private. SOX thus reduces investor
choice, makes many investments less liquid, and in the long run likely will discourage
entrepreneurship by denying start-ups access to financing in the capital markets.

Id. One could add to Bainbridge’s remark the fact that some of these smaller firms are
seeking alternative listing venues such as AIM. See infra Part III; see also William J.
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of Going Private
(Emory Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 05-4, Feb. 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=672761 (providing interesting empirical data to support the
hypothesis that smaller firms are disproportionately affected by one-size-fits-all rules
like the ones contained in SOX).
89. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 12-13.
90. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69, at 4 (arguing that although investors do
not like to be defrauded and do want some regulation, they “will find such regulation
valuable only if the benefit from reduced fraud is greater than the cost of regulatory
compliance”).
91. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 14-15. Competition among
exchanges has been escalating in recent times, leading to highly publicized events such
as the NYSE’s acquisition of Euronext, NASDAQ’s failed attempts to acquire the LSE
and, of course, the latter’s attempt to acquire the Borsa Italiana. See id. at 14 n.31; see
also Davidoff, supra note 43, at 14-15.
92. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance (Columbia Law
Sch. Working Paper No. 205, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315840
[hereinafter Coffee, Cross-Listings]; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18-19.
According to Jackson and Gkantinis, the demutualization and subsequent listing of
stock exchanges has changed their inherent incentive structure, such that these entities
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An assortment of securities by-products could result, such as
stringent requirements that enhance bonding benefits, or cheap access to
equity for small firms. 93 The introduction of lower market tiers with
varying degrees of regulatory stringency could enhance public welfare,
while still retaining main market regulatory levels. 94 Each tier would
possess unique advantages and impose a certain level of expenditure in
accordance with the cost/benefit structure explained below.
B. The Cost/Benefit Structure of Financial Markets
Financial market access provides public firms with a series of
benefits unavailable to private companies. It also imposes significant
costs upon a firm’s operations. The extent to which a company derives a
net benefit from gaining admittance to a stock exchange depends largely
on the relevant regulatory model, as well as on the firm’s particular
traits. For instance, the strict U.S. securities framework creates a niche
in which companies benefit from reductions in the cost of capital and a
higher valuation premium. 95 These conditions are optimal for large
firms that pursue public equity financing or that cross-list for bonding
purposes. 96 Conversely, jurisdictions that feature lighter regulation can
offer smaller firms heightened visibility and liquidity at lower cost.97
This divergence in regulatory models leads authors to categorize the
levels of regulatory stringency available for companies seeking equity
now cater to the interests of shareholders instead of their members. See Howell E.
Jackson & Stavros Gkantinis, Markets as Regulators: A Survey 11-15 (Harvard Law &
Econ.
Discussion
Paper
No.
579,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=960168. This has increased competitive pressures
among exchanges, which now seek to increase profit margins by developing and
offering new products. See id.
93. Cf. Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18-19.
94. See id. at 59-60. Coffee posits that it may be perverse to listen to the siren call
of those who intend to reduce the levels of regulatory stringency for listed companies in
the U.S. In his opinion, this would increase the cost of capital in the U.S. and reduce
the benefits arising from the bonding premium available to firms that cross-list into U.S.
capital markets. Id.
95. See, e.g., Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6 (suggesting that higher disclosure
standards have a considerable impact in lowering the cost of capital for listed firms);
Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 1 (same); Romano, supra note 3 (same).
96. See Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 36, at 6.
97. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 19. However, firms listing in these
markets would not benefit from the lower cost of capital that characterizes jurisdictions
with a higher level of enforcement. See id.
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financing. Although several of these market taxonomies exist, this
Article refers to a sequential classification in which jurisdictions abide
by low, middle or high regulatory models. 98
In each model, the pros and cons of listing vary gradually. One
must understand the cost/benefit structure of capital markets to measure
the impact of the disparities upon various categories of firms. 99 Firms
incur both direct and indirect costs upon going public and maintaining
their listing. The direct costs of going public may include initial listing
fees, IPO underwriting fees, professional fees like legal and accounting
advisers, and other compliance expenses. 100 Indirect costs of going
public include the loss of private control suffered by controlling
shareholders, like the loss of proprietary information due to disclosure
requirements, and IPO underpricing, which can occur in some listing
venues. 101 Direct costs of remaining listed include recurring expenses,
like stock exchange fees, legal and accounting advisory fees, or charges
for new issuances of stock. Indirect costs of remaining listed can
include diverted managers’ attention from maximizing shareholder
value, distorted directors’ and managers’ incentive structures, and
management exposure to excessive litigation. 102 Figure 1 shows the cost
structure of capital markets.
98. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44-50. Although this paper classifies these
approaches sequentially, it is important to note the approach suggested by Jackson and
Gkantinis, whereby regulatory responsibility is divided into a Government-led model
(e.g., France and Germany), a Flexibility model (e.g., U.K. and Hong Kong) and a
Cooperation model (e.g., U.S. and Canada). See Jackson & Gkantinis, supra note 92, at
3.
99. See Coates, supra note 4, at 92; Amin N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real:
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2001) [hereinafter Licht, Regulation] (arguing that pricing legal
rules is a complex task). Although some of these costs and benefits may be weighed
and measured accurately, certain factors, such as gauging indirect costs, make it
difficult to calculate the overall effect of securities regulation. Coates, supra note 4, at
106.
100. See CHRISTOPH KASERER & DIRK SCHIERECK, DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG, THE COST
OF CAPITAL: GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
STUDY (2006) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law). Such
compliance costs may refer to specific corporate governance or other requirements
imposed in different regulatory frameworks. Id.
101. Cf. Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 3 (detailing an analysis of IPO
underpricing in junior equity markets).
102. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69, at 2 (arguing that these indirect costs
have a significant impact on financial markets and that SOX raised indirect costs to a
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FIGURE 1
THE COST STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL MARKET
TRANSACTION AND REGULATORY COSTS OF LISTING
Going Public

Direct Costs

Remain Public

Indirect Costs

Direct Costs

IPO underwriting

Underpricing

SEO underwriting

Trading costs

Initial listing fees

Partial or total loss
of control

Listing fees

Loss of proprietary
information

Professional fees
Compliance costs

Loss of proprietary
information

Professional fees
Compliance costs

Advertising

Advertising

Other costs

Other costs

Indirect Costs

Negative impact on
management

Source: KASERER & SCHIERECK, supra note 100, at 13.
Firms also derive many benefits from gaining admittance to capital
markets. For instance, in order to address increasing levels of
competition, listing allows companies to raise equity for expansion or
maintenance plans. 103 Firms might also reduce or eliminate higherinterest debt obligations by raising less costly funds in equity markets.104
Market listing can also provide an exit mechanism for incumbent
shareholders, 105 or enhance a company’s visibility and reputation.106
point where the U.S. market has been severely affected).
103. See Felice B. Friedman & Claire Grose, Promoting Access to Primary Equity
Markets: A Legal and Regulatory Approach, 7-8, 13 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working
Paper No. 3892, 2006).
104. See Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE VOLUME 1 375, 378 (B. Espen Eckbo ed.,
2007).
105. See Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998); Cf.
Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A Cross Country Comparison of Full
and Partial Venture Capital Exists, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 512 (2003) (discussing
that an IPO allows venture capitalists to obtain a significant return on their initial
investment and entrepreneurs to regain control of the newly-listed company).
106. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103 (explaining that academic literature
regarding the listing decision is profuse); Ivo Welch & Jay Ritter, A Review of IPO
Activity, Pricing and Allocations 5-6 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 02-01,
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Small and medium-sized companies are particularly drawn to equity
financing, due to credit constraints and the high cost of capital that debt
financing can pose. 107 Credit constraints are largely the result of
financial entities’ bias toward projects with low risk. 108 The provisions
contained in the Basel II Accord might have further tightened credit for
small companies, 109 luring them away from debt financing and into
capital markets. 110
More stringent regulation, however, is a two-way street. Academic
literature refers extensively to the “bonding hypothesis,” whereby crosslisting firms profit from adopting the higher governance standards of a
foreign jurisdiction. 111 A listed company’s management can seek to
2002) (classifying the reasons for going public under the Life-Cycle Model, in which
companies that reach a specific size have more to gain from going public, and the
Market-Timing Model, in which companies will not go public if they consider that the
market will undervalue them).
107. See Don Cruickshank, Market Failure in the Provision of Equity to SMEs, in
COMPETITION IN UK BANKING: A REPORT TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER 169
(2000) (analyzing the different causes of such credit constraints).
108. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN GROWTH MARKET 5 (Oct. 2005) (a study
prepared for the LSE).
109. See MONDO VISIONE LTD., WORLD EXCHANGES: GLOBAL INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.mondovisione.com/index.cfm?section=order&action=detail&id=2
(“The
implementation of more stringent lending rules for E.U. banks under the Basel II
Capital Adequacy Directive may provide further encouragement for small European
companies to raise funds by going public.”).
110. See id. Credit constraints have a larger effect on European firms than on their
American counterparts, given the former’s higher reliance on debt for financing
purposes. See G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of
the World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom 21 (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 200414, 2004), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2004/2004/200414.pdf.
111. See, e.g., Coffee, Cross-Listings, supra note 92, at 78; Coffee, Enforcement,
supra note 6, at 5; Jonathan Witmer, Why Do Firms Cross-Delist? An Examination of
the Determinants and Effects of Cross-Delisting 5 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.fma.org/SLC/Papers/Cross_delistings.pdf; Karolyi,
supra note 110, at 14. But cf. Licht, Bonding, supra note 85, at 148-49 (rebutting
bonding as an instrument for merely improving corporate governance standards, and
contending that the aim of cross-listing for bonding purposes is twofold and ultimately
unrelated to bona fide self-discipline on behalf of managers). Licht refers to corporate
governance as a second-order consideration that can even have a negative role in the
context of bonding and cross-listing, to the extent that it deters some issuers from listing
in markets with more stringent regulation or gives rise to exemptions granted by the
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increase firm value by cross-listing in a foreign market, voluntarily
subjecting the company to more stringent regulation in the second
jurisdiction. 112 In so doing, the firm adopts—at least in part—the
foreign governance regime and is “bonded” by its more severe
provisions. 113 Bonding benefits are usually exploited by larger public
companies that have sufficient resources to afford an increase in
regulatory compliance costs. 114
If regulation is relaxed, the utility of bonding can be significantly
stunted, especially in the U.S. market—the venue most often targeted for
bonding. 115 Regulatory costs in the U.S. and European traditional
exchanges, however, could be too high for small and mid-size
companies that pursue equity financing. 116
Specialized market
segments, not subject to a plethora of costly securities regulation, could
provide these companies with public equity until they reach a stage in
their growth cycles that allows them to list in senior markets.
C. The Public Equity Funding Gap
Clearly, firms must take into account the particular cost/benefit
structure of the venue in which they intend to issue and trade their shares
before listing or cross-listing in capital markets. Such analysis, if
conducted properly, allows firms to maximize the utility obtained from
accessing a specific equity market. For instance, a large, private U.S.
local regulator to foreign firms that cross-list (i.e., the “avoiding hypothesis”). See id. at
142.
112. See Witmer, supra note 111, at 5 (arguing that “in this case, management
receives a net utility gain as the increase in their utility from firm value outweighs the
utility reduction from the loss of some private benefits of control”).
113. See, e.g., id. By listing in the U.S., firms have traditionally maximized bonding
benefits since, upon listing, the firm is monitored closely by multiple constituencies,
including institutional investors that acquire shares in the company, lurking private
equity and hedge funds, auditors, and even the Securities and Exchange Commission.
See id.
114. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 2.
115. See, e.g., AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, WHITE PAPER (First
Columbus Invs. & London Stock Exch.), 2006, at 2, http://www.firstcolumbus.com/fc_publications.php (accept “Disclaimer”; then download “AIM in a
U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths”). In spite of the alleged negative effects of
SOX, the U.S. share of global IPOs increased from 8% in 2001 to 15% in 2005,
showing that SOX may have more to it than meets the eye. See id.
116. See id. (comparing the regulatory environments of London and New York for
small companies); Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 2.
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firm might find it optimal to list in the NYSE or NASDAQ, despite the
high costs imposed by U.S. regulation, due to the multiple benefits the
firm would derive from such a listing. 117 Similarly, a listed European
firm may opt to undergo a cross-listing in either of these exchanges,
whether to profit from the bonding benefits associated with a U.S. listing
or to create or expand its U.S. operations. 118 A flawed analysis of the
cost/benefit structure of listing venues could lead to adverse results.119
Absent special circumstances, a NASDAQ-listed company that seeks to
improve its valuation premium by undergoing multiple listings in South
American stock exchanges might find its task highly unrewarding. 120
It follows from the previous discussion that an optimal listing venue
for each type of firm exists, depending on specific traits like market
capitalization and growth stage, and market conditions at the time of
listing. 121 Assuming this hypothesis is accurate, recent events in Europe
and the United States might have altered the optimal choice of venue for
small-cap firms, excluding them from traditional stock exchanges. First,
regulatory costs for listed companies have dramatically increased due to
the burden of SOX compliance 122 and the stringent corporate
governance and listing standards mandated by the main stock
exchanges. 123
These costs disproportionately affect small firms,
117. See, e.g., Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 71. A large private firm may,
for example, lower its cost of capital, obtain higher visibility, or secure sufficient funds
for expansion plans. See id.
118. Royal Philips Electronics N.V. exemplifies the typical European corporation
with a dual listing. Its shares are traded both in the NYSE (ticker: PHG) and Euronext
Amsterdam (ticker: PHI).
119. See Witmer, supra note 111, at 30-34.
120. See generally id. at 26 (discussing NASDAQ cross-listing generally).
121. Cf. Wolfgang Aussenegg et al., Sticky Prices: IPO Pricing on NASDAQ and
the Neuer Markt 39 (Apr. 2002) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302917. Market capitalization in
the IPO stage refers to the value obtained after multiplying the offer price times the
number of shares outstanding after completion of the offering. See id.
122. See Coates, supra note 4, at 107 (presenting evidence which suggests that SOX
increases auditing costs by a ratio of $1 million per $1 billion of revenue). But see
THOMAS E. HARTMAN, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA
OF SARBANES-OXLEY (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/publications/pub_detai
l.aspx?pubid=3736 (presenting the results of a survey showing that SOX costs appear to
be decreasing as firms streamline compliance with the Act’s provisions).
123. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64154-01 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving the NYSE’s and NASDAQ’s enhanced
corporate governance standards for listed companies, which significantly raised the
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precluding them from listing in mainstream regulated markets, or even
causing them to de-list. 124 Although European listing costs are lower
than in the U.S., they can also prove to be too high for small-cap firms
seeking access to such venues. 125 The reticence of market-makers to
underwrite offerings below a certain amount also increases entry barriers
for small firms. 126
Second, the recent enlargement of a public equity funding gap in
Europe and the U.S. also inhibits small-cap firms from listing in
traditional stock exchanges. 127 An increase in listing costs and a reversal
in market trends after the dot com bubble ruptured exacerbated the
funding gap. In the years preceding the downfall of the technology
market, small firms with high growth potential—particularly high-tech
or internet-focused companies—could easily obtain equity funding by
issuing shares in listing venues like NASDAQ or the German Neuer

level of regulatory stringency for such firms in regards to, inter alia, conflicts of interest
and related party transactions, director independence, and audit committees). Both
exchanges have also set forth multiple listing standards establishing market cap
thresholds, restrictions on the minimum number of shareholders, track records, and
similar requirements. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/listing_information.stm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007); NYSE
Euronext, Listing Standards, available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/102222
1392369.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
124. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 13. Given the high costs that the U.S.
regulatory framework imposes on these firms, they may be forced to operate under low
or even negative profit margins. See id.
125. See ABBANAT, supra note 88. Evidence of this assertion may be found in the
high number of low-cost stock exchanges currently spawning in Europe. Id.
126. See Posting of Dale Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, London’s AIM,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2006/08/londons_aim.html#comments
(Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Oesterle, London’s AIM] (suggesting that underwriters are
no longer interested in IPOs in which a firm intends to raise amounts below $50
million, since their fees would not cover their time expenditure).
127. See Cruickshank, supra note 107, at 172-73. However, this private equity gap
refers to start-ups seeking to raise amounts between £100,000 and £250,000 and not to
the types of companies that would seek an AIM listing. These firms have already
reached a later stage in their growth cycle and, thus, should not be confused with the
market failure, usually labeled as the “equity gap,” affecting start-ups. See id. at 173.
Cf. Community Guidelines On State Aid To Promote Risk Capital Investments In Small
And Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2006 O.J. (C 194) 2 [hereinafter Community
Guidelines]. Firms in an early growth stage are usually equity-constrained, given the
existence of sharp information asymmetries between owners and investors, with higher
risk exposure for the latter. See id.
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Markt. 128 The market collapse at the end of the twentieth century
marked a turning point, as the European New Markets disappeared and
IPO volumes floundered on both sides of the Atlantic. 129 Not only did
successful IPOs after the year 2000 significantly drop, the average
market capitalization for issuing companies increased dramatically.
Empirical studies of IPO market trends illustrate this point: during the
previous decade, 62% of the companies engaging in IPOs had a market
capitalization of less than $200 million, but during 2004-05, only 30%
fell within that range. 130 Table 1 shows the discussed reduction in IPO
volume.
TABLE 1
REDUCTION IN IPO VOLUME

IPO MARKET TRENDS
Trend (yearly average)

1990s

2001-2003

2004-2005

Number of IPOs

533

87

225

% with deal size
Below $50 Million

59%

24%

23%

% with deal size
Below $200 Million

62%

28%

30%

Source: ThinkEquity Partners 131

128. See Aussenegg et al., supra note 121, at 39; see also Goergen et al., supra note
35, at 8-9.
129. See Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 8-9 (focusing on the dissolution of the
European new markets after 2000).
130. See Posting of Michael T. Moe to ThinkBlog, http://www.thinkequity.com/mtarchive/2006/03/aim_for_the_sta.html (Mar. 27, 2006, 10:02 EST). The number of
companies with a market cap under $50 million diminished from 59% to 23% during
the same periods.
131. ThinkEquity Partners, ThinkBlog, (Mar. 2006), http://www.thinkequity.com/mt
-archive/2006/03/index.html (IPO Market Trends table).
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Core 132 and non-core 133 listing requirements in venues such as
NASDAQ can prevent small companies from listing, or even lead to
compulsory delisting for non-compliance, 134 which adds to the public
equity funding gap. The demutualization process of stock exchanges, by
which such entities become listed companies subject to public
shareholder scrutiny, also negatively impacts small-cap firms’ choice of
listing venue. 135 As exchanges in Europe and the U.S. demutualize,
their incentive structures adjust toward a revenue-seeking model,
excluding some risk-laden small firms seeking to raise low amounts of
equity through a public issuance. 136
The circumstances previously described propelled the emergence of
new listing venues, tailored to fit the needs of small firms with highgrowth potential. 137 Entering the marketplace with a fury, 138 these new
alternative market segments differ from their predecessors (e.g., Neuer
Markt, NASDAQ during the 1990s). 139 The next part traces the rise of
London’s AIM, the most successful of these listing venues, and provides
some insight into AIM’s regulatory model.
III. THE RISE OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET
As financial markets race toward convergence and private equity
and hedge funds rampage across jurisdictions in their quest for absolute
returns, the success of a London-based “junior” market draws the
collective attention of international market participants. 140 The LSE,

132. Cf. Jeffrey H. Harris et al., Off But Not Gone: A Study of NASDAQ De-listings
4 (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2004-22, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628203 (referring to the NASDAQ stock market). Core
requirements can refer to variables such as the minimum number of shareholders,
market capitalization, and the number of market makers. See id.
133. Cf. id. Non-core variables often refer to minimum market float and bid price in
a share issuance. See id.
134. Harris et al., supra note 132, at 4. It is important to note that both NASDAQ
(NASDAQ Capital Market) and the NYSE (NYSE Arca) launched trading platforms
with lower core and non-core requirements specifically designed for small-cap firms.
See infra Part III.
135. Coffee, Cross-Listings, supra note 92, at 52.
136. Id. at 55-56.
137. Oesterle, London’s AIM, supra note 126; Moe, supra note 130.
138. Moe, supra note 130.
139. Id.
140. Moe, supra note 130.
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which set up AIM as a low-cost segment for small companies, draws
praise from investors, firms, and policy-makers alike, due to AIM’s
impressive results since 2000. 141 Although AIM has been in place for
over a decade, 142 recent market conditions facilitated its unprecedented
growth, surpassing even mature markets such as NASDAQ and the
NYSE, according to the number of IPOs since 2004. 143 Despite a
significant slowdown during 2006, AIM still posted 341 IPOs, increased
its total listed companies to 1,634 (including 306 foreign firms), and
raised $55 billion. 144 AIM even captured the attention of a number of
U.S. firms that may have previously sought a listing with NASDAQ. 145
141.
142.

Id.
See STÉPHANE ROUSSEAU, THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CANADIAN STOCK
EXCHANGES: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT MARKET 93 (2006) (research study commissioned by the Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada). AIM was set up in 1995 after its
predecessor, the Unlisted Securities Market, floundered in the midst of a severe
financial downturn brought about by rising interest rates and a recession in the U.K. See
id.; see also Tim Bauer & J. Efrim Boritz, Report on the UK’s Alternative Investment
Market – AIM 4 (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://accounting.uwaterloo.ca/research/publications/AIM_Discussion_Paper-rev5.doc
(explaining that the reduction of the waiting period for companies seeking an LSE
listing also contributed to the collapse of the Unlisted Securities Market); ABBANAT,
supra note 88, at 14 (“AIM was first announced in a proposal by the London Stock
Exchange in April 1994 in response to heavy lobbying from the City Group for Smaller
Companies (CISCO), led by Sir Ronald Cohen of Apax Partners and Andrew Beeson of
Beeson Gregory.”).
143. See LEONIE BELL ET AL., OXERA CONSULTING LTD., THE COST OF CAPITAL: AN
INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON
56
(June
2006),
available
at
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/economicresearch (follow “Research Publications”
hyperlink; then follow “Archived Reports 2000-2006” hyperlink; then follow
“Download the Cost of Capital published report PDF” hyperlink). But see BELL ET AL.,
supra, at 59-60 (showing that market capitalization in both NASDAQ and the NYSE is
significantly higher than in AIM); see also Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 5. AIM
companies also under-perform NASDAQ and NYSE companies by almost every other
measurement. Id. This might be due to the fact that AIM companies are in an earlier
stage in their growth cycles than the firms listed in NASDAQ or the NYSE. Cf. id. at 6.
144. LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM: SUPPORTING THE GROWTH OF SMALL AND
MIDCAP COMPANIES 5 (2006), available at http://www.brownrudnick.com/event/pdf/AI
M_USA_FINAL.pdf; O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP, THE LSE IS BOOMING – BUT WILL
THE BUBBLE BURST? 1 (May 2007), available at http://www.omm.com/webdata/content
/publications/client_alert_communicate_2007_05_21e.htm [hereinafter O’MELVENY &
MYERS, LLP, LSE] (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
145. See Abulani Lefall, L.A. Firms Lured by Foreign Exchanges; Launching IPOs
is Easier but U.S. Markets Still Goal, L.A. BUS. J., Apr. 23, 2007 (reporting that fifty-
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AIM’s remarkable growth is not exempt from a certain degree of
skepticism. The most caustic critics contend that investors in AIM can
be easily manipulated and even defrauded, given its sub-optimal
disclosure and corporate governance standards. 146 SEC Commissioner
Roel Campos recently triggered a media dispute with LSE officials by
comparing AIM to a casino in which 30% of listed companies
disappeared a year after gaining admission. 147 A majority of detractors
adopt the milder view that AIM companies only pose a high risk to
investors, given their reduced dimensions 148 and the lack of specific
hurdles for listing. 149 Others simply recall the recent collapse of the
European New Markets (e.g., the German Neuer Markt) and discard
AIM’s success as a fleeting phenomenon. 150
While some of these negative reviews could be accurate, 151 AIM’s
approach to regulation gives it an edge in the market for small-cap highgrowth companies. 152 As a result of this competitive advantage, stock
exchanges worldwide attempt to replicate AIM’s model. Europe, for
instance, has experienced an outbreak of similar trading venues: the
one U.S. companies had listed on AIM as of Oct. 30, 2006, marking an increase of over
100% more than the previous year); see also AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some
Myths, supra note 115, at 1.
146. Iain Dey, You Have to Go Into AIM with Your Eyes Open, THE SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), June 18, 2006, at 6.
147. See AIM Stock Market ‘Like a Casino,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6433637.stm. Commissioner Campos’ comments
may have been somewhat exaggerated. See Adam Smith, A Sharp AIM, TIME, Mar. 29,
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1604485,00.html
?iid=chix-sphere.
148. See, e.g., Herb Greenberg, Is IPO Slowdown a Bad Thing, As Sarbanes-Oxley
Foes Claim?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2006, at B4 (arguing that AIM subjects investors to
heightened risk exposure, due to the characteristics of its companies). This critique is
based on profit warning reports issued by some of AIM’s smaller companies during
2006. Id.
149. See David Blackwell & John Gapper, NYSE Chief Says AIM Must Raise
Standards, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 27, 2007, at 8. NYSE’s chief executive officer,
John Thain, publicly called for more rigid regulation in AIM to prevent an erosion of
public confidence in the City of London as a main financial center. Id. Note, however,
that such criticism may be a result of competitive pressures, as the NYSE, since its
Euronext takeover, must compete with the LSE for international and European listings.
Cf. id.
150. Dey, supra note 146 (discussing the successes and failures of AIM).
151. Id. (stating that there have been a high number of crashes on AIM, including
Regal Petroleum and Chariot).
152. Davidoff, supra note 43, at 45.
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Borsa Italiana launched its Mercato Expandi in December 2003; the
analogous Irish Enterprise Exchange was created in April 2005;
Euronext has been promoting its Alternext segment since 2005; the
Deutsche Börse set forth its Entry Standard segment in December 2005,
and the Nordic OMX introduced its First North segment last year. 153
AIM’s model has also served as a prototype for the New Zealand
Alternative Market, which launched in November 2003, and for the
trading platform currently under design by the Singapore Stock
Exchange. 154 While these fledging venues might be able to emulate
AIM’s achievements, it seems unlikely, since AIM owes its staggering
success to a wealth of interlinked elements not present elsewhere.
A. Supply and Demand—The Causes of Aim’s Success
AIM has thrived in recent years, due to a series of interrelated
events. Following the turn of the twenty-first century, London continues
to rise in prominence among the world’s most important international
financial centers, amassing large pools of liquidity and gathering
specialists in multiple fields: investment banks, underwriters,
institutional investors, and foreign and domestic companies. London’s
increasing sophistication as a provider of financial services results from
a decades-long reform movement intended to transform the city into a
competitive venue. 155 The results of this comprehensive overhaul are
manifest; a study released in June 2007 proclaimed that London deposed
New York as the leading financial services hub in the world. 156 Several

153. See BOARD ET AL., supra note 75, at 185. Other examples in the same region
include the Guernsey Stock Exchange, the Nordic Growth Market in Sweden, the Local
Business Exchange in Birmingham, and the M: Access in Munich. Id.
154. See Ass’n of Small and Medium Enters., 3rd Board Listing: A Viable
Alternative for SMEs Looking for Growth?, ENTREPRENEURS’ DIG., available at
http://www.asme.org.sg/subpage.aspx?pageName=digest. Listing venues specializing
in smaller companies have also spawned in Central and South America. However,
these new market segments feature more stringent corporate governance and disclosure
standards than the corresponding main markets. Brazil’s Novo Mercado and Costa
Rica’s Mercado Alternativo para Acciones appear to be less modeled on AIM than on
the now extinct German Neuer Markt. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 50.
155. See London as a Financial Centre: Capital City, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21,
2006.
156. See Chia-Peck Wong, London Tops as World Commerce Center, Says
Mastercard, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 12, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news
?pid=newsarchive&sid=af92ReNSibw4. The index used for this study combined “six
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ingredients, including a sophisticated corporate governance system, an
efficient regulator embodied in the Financial Services Authority, an
aggressive marketing campaign, and the increase of regulatory costs in
the U.S., contributed to London’s outranking of New York as the
leading center for finance. 157
The LSE profits vastly from this upward trend, outstripping even its
main competitor, the NYSE, in number of IPOs and money raised
through initial offerings in 2006. 158 AIM capitalized on London’s
success, evidenced by its IPO volume, its number of listed companies,
and its share issuances, each of which surged at an almost exponential
rate over the past few years. 159 Yet, AIM is not merely a free-rider on
London’s and the LSE’s reputation. Rather, AIM succeeds because it
supplies a scarce product to the marketplace: rapid, low-cost access to
public equity for small firms with high growth potential. 160 London’s
status as one of the world’s leading financial hubs simply adds to AIM’s
prominence and success.
Following the enactment of SOX and the burst of the dot com
bubble, the regulatory costs of equity financing through U.S. capital
markets skyrocketed. 161 Small-cap companies were disproportionately
measures of commercial power including flows of finance, volumes of business and the
creation and dissemination of knowledge. It was developed by a team of academics
specializing in economics, business, urban studies and finance.” See Beattie, supra note
76.
157. See International Equity Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance, CAIR
NEWSL. (Manchester Bus. Sch., Manchester, U.K.), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.mbs.ac.uk/Research/analysisinvestment/documents/CAIRNewsletter21-1106.pdf.
158. O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP, LSE, supra note 144.
159. ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 92 (“Being based in London, AIM enables
resource companies to enter a sophisticated market that provides both a source of
capital and a community of knowledgeable professionals.”). London brings together
different elements that create optimal conditions for a market like AIM to develop—a
large pool of liquidity, a sophisticated marketplace, and a flexible and efficient legal
system. See id.
160. See London Stock Exch., About AIM, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/e
n-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/About+AIM/ (“To join AIM,
companies do not need a particular financial track record or trading history. There is
also no minimum requirement in terms of size or number of shareholders. This more
flexible approach reflects the fact that AIM was designed specifically for smaller
growing companies.”).
161. Scott Liebs, Five Years and Accounting, CFO.COM, July 1, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/9393501/c_9394789?f=options.
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affected by this cost increase in Europe and the U.S. 162 Consequently,
small firms seeking to raise capital through financial markets turned
away from more traditional listing venues such as NASDAQ and started
favoring exchanges which provided expeditious and low-cost access to
equity financing. 163 Despite the existence of several venues that
specialize in small-cap firms, AIM was the first-mover in supplying the
marketplace with a lower regulatory burden, while enhancing listed
companies’ reputations and providing access to institutional investors
seeking firms with long-term growth potential.
Furthermore, as the primary U.S. stock exchanges demutualized in
order to become public companies themselves, their incentive structures
recalibrated into a revenue-seeking model that, to some degree, excluded
risk-laden small firms trying to raise low amounts of equity through a
public issuance. 164 A reversal in IPO market trends also adversely
impacted small-cap firms. 165 These factors exacerbated the public
equity funding gap, which affects companies with a low market
capitalization. 166 While the average market capitalization for an AIM
162. See Posting of Dan Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, Cross-Listing
Premiums, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/archives.html (Apr. 27,
2007) [hereinafter Oesterle, Cross-Listing Premiums] (explaining that small companies
are reluctant to bear such high costs to obtain a mere “seal of approval” regarding their
corporate governance and disclosure standards). Oesterle’s metaphor clearly portrays
the problem:
[The U.S. established] a very high standard of reporting that only very large, well run
companies can use as a ‘seal of approval.’ It makes sense for them to do so; smaller
and medium companies with more average business practices no longer find is [sic]
sensible to incur the high costs of using the ‘seal.’

Id.
163. See London Stock Exch., About AIM, supra note 160 (“Since its launch in
1995, over 2,500 companies have joined AIM − raising more than £34 [billion] in the
process.”).
164. See Oesterle, London’s AIM, supra note 126.
165. Id.
166. Cf. Cruickshank, supra note 107 (arguing that the “public equity funding gap”
arises from a disparity between the demand of low-cap firms that require smaller
investments and the market supply of such investments). This phenomenon is
somewhat different to the “equity gap” market failure that affects firms in the initial
stages of their growth cycles. Id. The equity gap is commonly present in start-ups in
which “high transactional and monitoring costs associated with early stage ventures
make them unattractive for investment.” See Jimmy Schwarzkopf & Moren Lévesque,
Closing the “Equity Gap” in Startup/Seed Investment for ICT Ventures: The Israeli
Experience (unpublished), available at http://www.mansci.uwaterloo.ca/~levesque/pape
rs/Schwarzkopf%20&%20Levesque.pdf. However, the equity gap can also affect
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company is close to $70 million, NASDAQ’s average is closer to $1
billion; the NYSE’s average exceeds both figures. 167 Thus, AIM
currently supplies access to the capital market vis-à-vis an increasing
demand for equity funding by companies with low market
capitalization. 168 While NASDAQ formerly covered this market
segment, particularly during the 1990s with respect to high-tech low-cap
firms, 169 it has since matured, shifting its focus to larger firms. 170
Consequently, undersized companies in the U.S. that might have trouble
enterprises in later growth stages. This apparently led the European Commission to
issue a set of guidelines concerning state aid to reduce the equity gap for small, highgrowth companies. See Community Guidelines, supra note 127. Interestingly, an
accompanying memorandum even references “alternative stock markets specialized in
SMEs including high-growth companies.” Memorandum from Eur. Comm’n on
Guidelines on State Aid to Promote Risk Capital Investment in SMEs (Memo. No.
06/295) (July 19, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref
erence=MEMO/06/295&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
167. See AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 3; see
also Rick Kennedy, Law Firms take Aim at IPOs Listing Overseas, SAN FRANCISCO
DAILY J., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/S
F_Daily_Journal_120806.pdf (“The average market capitalization of a company on the
NASDAQ is $1.2 billion, and on the AIM it is $89 million.”). It is also important to
note that both NASDAQ and the NYSE set strict track record requirements for initial
listing and thresholds for continued listing. Any failure to comply with such
requirements will result in either a rejection of initial listing or a forced delisting
following a verification process. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, supra
note 123; NYSE Euronext, Listing Standards, supra note 123.
168. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 23; Doidge et al., supra note 1, at 42
(“If anything has changed in the aftermath of SOX, it is that the non-listed firms have
become smaller and are therefore less likely to list on the U.S. exchanges or the Main
Market in London.”). The authors further contend that it is firm size, rather than a
reduction in the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets, that has led to a shift in crosslistings. Id.
169. See Robert E. Grady, The Sarbox Monster, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2007, at A19.
In 1996, the average market capitalization for a tech-company undergoing a NASDAQ
IPO was close to $130 million. See id. Some historical figures shed further light on the
evolution of NASDAQ share offerings: Intel’s 1970 IPO consisted of $8 million in
issued shares and a market cap of $53 million, and Cisco Systems raised only $50
million in 1990 and reached a market cap of $226 million. See id.
170. See OSBORNE CLARK, IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ? 4 (2006) [hereinafter IS AIM
THE NEW NASDAQ?]; see also Susan Arterian Chang, Tech Start-ups Spurn NASDAQ
for London, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/dec06/
4752 (“The NASDAQ Electronic Market, founded in 1971, for many years offered U.S.
entrepreneurs access to public equity. But these days NASDAQ is setting its sights on
larger corporations, the likes of Google and Microsoft.”).
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obtaining a NASDAQ listing may flock to AIM. 171 As of June 2007,
sixty-three U.S. firms worth $11 billion had successfully completed an
AIM listing. 172 Figure 2 shows the different market capitalization focus
between NASDAQ and AIM and what has been called the “AIM sweet
spot.” 173
FIGURE 2
AIM VS NASDAQ—COMPARATIVE MARKET CAP FOCUS

Source: IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170.
The state of affairs in Europe also contributed to a climate in which
AIM has been able to prosper. In an effort to imitate NASDAQ’s
experience in attracting high growth companies with a relatively low
market capitalization, several European stock exchanges launched
specialized market segments during the 1990s. Europe’s experiment
with market design led to the creation of venues featuring elevated
regulatory requirements, including high disclosure and conformance to
international accounting standards. 174 The first of these venues aimed at
start-up, high-growth enterprises was the pan-European stock market

171.
172.
173.

IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 13.
See infra Part III.C.
See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 927 n.59
(2006). This divergence in market cap focus allows AIM to capture trading that would
otherwise be done on NASDAQ. See id.
174. See Laura Botazzi & Marco Da Rin, Europe’s New Stock Markets (Ctr. for
Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 3521, 2002).
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EASDAQ, which began trading in November, 1996. 175 Subsequent
attempts to emulate NASDAQ’s model led to the creation of the Neuer
Markt sponsored by the Deutsche Börse, the Paris Stock Exchange’s
Nouveau Marché, the Italian Nuovo Mercato, the New Market of
Amsterdam Exchanges, and the Euro NM Brussels, among others.
Although these new markets might have temporarily reduced the public
equity funding gap, their ultimate failure paved the way for AIM to
capture a substantial portion of the market for small-cap funding. 176
Table 2 shows the dates in which the European New Markets were
launched and subsequently closed.
TABLE 2
RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN NEW MARKETS

EUROPEAN NEW MARKETS
Market

Country

Opening Date

Closing Date

Alternative
Investment Market
Nouveau Marché

UK

June 19, 1995

N/A

France

February 14, 1996

Pan-European

June, 1996

Eurolist as of
February 21, 2005
November 28,
2003

Germany

March 10, 1997

NMAX

Netherlands

March 25, 1997

Euro NM Brussels

Belgium

April 11, 1997

Nuovo Mercato

Italy

June 17 , 1999

EASDAQ
(renamed
NASDAQ Europe)
Neuer Markt

December 31,
2003
Eurolist as of
April 4, 2005
October 2000
MTAX as of
Sept. 19, 1995

Source: BOARD ET AL., supra note 75.
175. See Steven Weber & Elliot Posner, Creating a Pan-European Equity Market:
The Origins of EASDAQ, 7 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 529, 529 (2000).
176. See Hans-Peter Burghof & Adrian Hunger, Access to Stock Markets for Small
and Medium Sized Growth Firms: The Temporary Success and Ultimate Failure of
Germany’s Neuer Markt (Oct. 2003) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=497404; BOARD ET AL., supra note
75; Botazzi & Da Rin, supra note 174; Goergen et al., supra note 35 (offering a detailed
analysis concerning the deficiencies of the European New Markets, including IPO
underpricing, offerings with negative initial returns, and negative cumulative abnormal
returns).
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AIM’s success can also be attributed to its ability to avoid some of
the most significant factors responsible for the collapse of the European
New Markets. For instance, the New Markets narrowly focused on
high-tech companies, whose massive downturn during the dot com
bubble burst helped bring about their demise. 177 AIM companies’
broader range of economic activities could be what allowed it to endure
the demise of the technology sector worldwide. 178 Whereas the
NASDAQ of the 1990s and the European New Markets focused
primarily on technology stocks, AIM extended its scope to include firms
engaging in all sorts of industrial activities, such as mining, oil and gas,
and real estate (see Figure 3 below). 179 To ensure adequate compliance
with reporting rules in this highly diversified environment, thereby
protecting investor confidence in the market, AIM issues specialized
notices for certain sectors that require technical guidance in interpreting
disclosure requirements. 180 For instance, after Regal Petroleum’s shares
plummeted following fruitless oil exploration activities off the Greek
coast, 181 AIM issued a Guidance Note requiring independent reports for
reserves in admission documents and periodical market updates. 182 This

177. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21. The authors attribute AIM’s
success largely to a matter of timing. Id. However, this interpretation fails to fully
recognize the fact that AIM did not depend exclusively on the technology sector to
survive.
178. See Mark Landler, German Technology Stock Market To Be Dissolved, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at W1 (asserting that the burst of the dot com bubble had a
negative impact on some European New Markets, such as the German Neuer Markt,
and contributed significantly to their decline).
179. Cf. London Stock Exch., techMARK: A Focus on Innovation,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/techmark (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). In the
midst of the dot com bubble, NASDAQ and other European New Markets impinged on
AIM’s relevance in the technology sector. In response, the LSE launched a specialized
market segment, techMARK, to focus exclusively on tech stocks. TechMARK was
launched in November 1999 as a segment of the LSE’s Main Market. Despite this new
segment’s relative success, there appears to be little or no overlap with AIM companies
since techMARK targets larger enterprises. See id.
180. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules for Companies, pt. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.spgmedia.com/documents/AIMRULESFORCOMPANIES_2007.pdf
[hereinafter AIM Rules for Companies].
181. See Heather Connon, Don’t Panic If Your Fund Manager Slips Up, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Jan. 29, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/jan/29/fundsbondstr
usts.investments.
182. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules – Guidance Note for Mining, Oil and Gas
Companies (2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/01
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close monitoring of market developments allows AIM to promptly
adjust some of its rules to better suit its broad base of “customers” (i.e.,
investors and listed companies).
FIGURE 3
SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF AIM COMPANIES

Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131.
AIM has thus far eluded another likely cause for the failure of the
New Markets, the German Neuer Markt in particular—an apparent lack
of sophistication of both investors and regulatory authorities. 183 AIM’s
privileged location in London, the LSE’s reputation as a sophisticated
exchange, and the sophistication of the investors driven to AIM 184 all
B3C887-9559-458C-B19B-B41A6E641F9B/0/FinalGuidanceMOG.pdf.
183. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21.
184. See Excerpt to INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN AIM 2006, GROWTH COMPANY
INVESTOR (Teather & Greenwood, London, U.K.), available at http://www.londonstock
exchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/E416463D-CB0B-4949-B33E-8F7DAFD3DAAA/0/Instit
utionalInvestors4pp2006.pdf (explaining that given the risks associated with low-cap
companies and the relative illiquidity of AIM shares, owners of AIM stock are mostly
sophisticated institutional investors that seek long-term positions); Clara Furse, Taking
AIM at Small Caps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at 15. Although individual retail
investors are also encouraged to participate in AIM (AIM offers incentives in the form
of tax benefits), senior investors are the most common market players. See Daniel
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permit the exchange to succeed. Although some defects of the New
Markets may exist, like IPO underpricing, the fact that AIM outlived
and outperformed most of its New Market counterparts suggests its
continued success. 185
Recent changes in the European Union’s policy agenda have also
contributed to the growth of AIM. Traditionally, European firms have
relied on banks as the primary source of financing, due to the privileged
standing of credit institutions across the different Member States. 186
Small companies expose banks to high-growth potential as well as
riskier financing conditions. 187 Accordingly, these companies are
charged higher interest rates and must abide by more stringent
conditions when applying for debt financing. 188 The International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (the Basel
II Accords) aggravated this situation by reducing the availability of
financial credit for small and medium-sized enterprises. 189 As the
European Union moves away from a bank-based system and toward an
equity-oriented system, small and medium-sized firms turn to capital
markets—”growth” stock exchanges in particular—to obtain public

Thomas, AIM Promises the World Property Shares: Property Companies Are Homing
In on the ‘Junior’ Market, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2007, at 8.
185. See Goergen et al., supra note 35 (discussing how the Member States’ inability
to harmonize different sets of listing rules, the involvement of multiple national
regulators, and inefficient cross-border trading led the Belgian, Dutch and French
markets to merge, forming Euronext in 2000 and breaking up several of the New
Markets); NASDAQ Europe to Close, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3024558.stm (arguing that EASDAQ’s poor
performance paved the way for a successful takeover by NASDAQ in 2001, leading to
the creation of NASDAQ Europe, and that NASDAQ’s subsequent inability to improve
NASDAQ Europe’s results eventually led to a closing of European operations in 2003);
Davidoff, supra note 43, at 50 (asserting that high profile scandals and issuer
implosions led to the demise of the German Neuer Markt and its 2003 absorption into
Germany’s primary market). The French Nouveau Marché disappeared after the
introduction of the AIM-like Alternext segment by Euronext in 2005. Finally, the
Italian Nuovo Mercato was replaced by the STAR segment. Italy also introduced
Mercato Expandi, a listing venue similar to AIM. See Goergen et al., supra note 35, at
7-8.
186. See Franklin Allen, Laura Bartiloro & Oskar Kowalewski, The Financial
System of the E.U. 25 (2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=871454.
187. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 4.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 12.
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financing. 190 AIM captured a large number of these companies by
supplying expedited, low-cost access to equity, 191 made possible through
its unique regulatory model. 192
B. AIM’s Regulatory Model
AIM is an exchange-regulated venue featuring an array of
principles-based rules for publicly held companies. The genius of
AIM’s regulatory model lies with the comply-or-explain option provided
to each listed company to adapt to the exchange’s flexible and reduced
set of rules. 193 Flexibility notwithstanding, rule-tailoring is not a
reckless process governed by firms’ self-interest. While granting
companies regulatory compliance leeway, the exchange also mandates
continuous oversight and advice by a private party—the Nominated
Adviser (“Nomad”). 194 The Nomads’ role is central to AIM’s regulatory
model, as these entities act as gatekeepers, advisers, and regulators of
AIM-listed companies. 195 In advising each firm’s rule selection and
compliance, Nomads enable firms to abide by tailor-made regulation,
reducing regulatory costs in the process. 196 Further, a unique incentive
structure constrains Nomads from inattentively performing this role.197
Specifically, Nomads bear significant damages for tolerating
misdemeanors on behalf of their supervised companies, including the
loss of “reputational capital.” 198 Accordingly, AIM can be considered a
“reputational market,” in which investors rely on the standing of
190.
191.
192.
193.

Cf. id. at 8-9.
See id. at 16.
Cf. id. at 15-16.
Id. Listed companies have some freedom to interpret the principles-based rules
contained in AIM’s regulatory documents. AIM companies may conclude, for instance,
that certain rules do not apply to them, or even decide the way in which to abide by
certain disclosure requirements. This process of interpretation and selection is
conducted jointly with the Nominated Advisers, which decreases the likelihood of firms
behaving in an opportunistic manner in regards to their obligations as listed companies.
See generally FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/
frc/Combined%20code%202006%20OCTOBER.pdf.
194. See id. at 15.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 15-16.
197. See generally Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48 (explaining gatekeepers’
incentive structures in financial markets).
198. See generally id.
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Nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed companies, rather than on the
market’s regulation. 199
The nature of an exchange-regulated market segment permits
AIM’s model of self-imposed rules. 200 As such, AIM escapes most of
the mandatory provisions contained in European Union directives—as
implemented in the U.K.—and other rules applicable to companies listed
in the LSE. 201 Self-regulation is pivotal to AIM’s low regulatory burden
for several reasons: (1) companies seeking an AIM listing are not
subject to significant admission requirements; 202 (2) after admission is
granted, the ongoing obligations with which firms must comply are
comparatively lower than those that govern larger exchanges; and (3)
corporate governance provisions are not mandatory for AIM
companies. 203 Despite this light regime, most AIM firms voluntarily
subject themselves to higher corporate governance and disclosure
standards, due largely to Nomads’ advice and pressure from institutional
investors. 204 Again, this intentional abidance by higher standards does

199.
200.

See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 45.
See generally Pritchard, supra note 5 (arguing that, if left to their own devices,
exchanges are likely to find an optimal balance between regulatory costs and investor
protection); Ernest Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry SelfRegulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351 (2005) (providing an analysis of
self-regulation).
201. See Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) (Prospectus Directive). The
Prospectus Directive sets out financial reporting requirements and informs that since
2004, AIM is not considered a “regulated market” for the purposes of European
Directives. AIM, in light of its exemption from particular provisions under the
Prospectus Directive, grants listed status after submission of a simple admission
document, instead of a prospectus. See id.; see also AccountingWEB, Combined Code
on Corporate Governance—Overview, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/
cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=119232 (stating that the U.K.’s Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (2003) is not applicable to AIM-listed companies, although they may
voluntarily adopt the provisions contained therein).
202. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 15.
203. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 8.
204. See OSBORNE CLARK, WHY U.S. (AND NON-EUROPEAN COMPANIES) NEED AIM
(2005), available at http://www.casestudyagency.com/clientwork/OC_AIM_05.pdf
(explaining that institutional investors expect AIM-listed companies to abide by high
standards of disclosure and corporate governance); Monitoring and Taking Action on
Financial Performance, Corporate Governance and Corporate Responsibility, U.K.
RESPONSIBLE INV. POL’Y (Henderson Global Invs.), Apr. 2007, available at
http://www.henderson.com/home/uk/governance/responsible_investment/ (follow link
to “U.K. Responsible Investment Policy”).
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not raise regulatory costs to main market levels, since AIM firms still
benefit from customized compliance. 205
Another important element of AIM’s model is the composition of
its investor base. While few are start-ups, a majority of AIM-listed
companies have not yet reached the later, less risk-laden stages of their
growth cycles. 206 This could prove hazardous for unsophisticated
investors who lack both the knowledge and resources to conduct proper
inquiries into a firm’s prospects and activities. 207 Consequently, wealthy
individuals with experience in securities trading, institutional investors,
and entities specializing in AIM investments comprise most of AIM’s
investor base, 208 including financial powerhouses such as JP Morgan,
Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs, and investment funds like Fidelity
and Artemis Investments. 209 AIM has been aptly labeled as a “junior”
market for “senior” investors. 210 The venue’s location in London and
the large role played by institutional investors there favors this
situation. 211 Still, the LSE does attract more retail investors to AIM by
offering certain advantages, including tax breaks for individuals that
invest in its low-tier market segment. 212

205.
206.

See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 15-16.
See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 12. Though initially launched as a
market for low-caps, AIM is maturing, now turning its focus to mid-caps, whose
numbers in AIM have quadrupled since 2004. See id. at 4.
207. See S. M. Solaiman, Disclosure Philosophy for Investor Protection in
Securities Markets: Does One Size Fit All?, 28 COMPANY LAW. 139 (May 2007)
(stressing the importance of considering the level of sophistication of investors in
regards to stock exchanges and securities regulation). “Information and transaction
costs tend to be far more serious when it comes to doing business with unsophisticated
retail costumers, who may be poorly informed or find it difficult to shop around,
making them ripe for picking by unscrupulous operators.” Id.
208. See NICK ELLIS, COLLINS STEWART PLC, AIM: THE ROLE OF A NOMAD (2007),
available at http://www.ukinvest.gov.uk/Financial-services/4009261/en-GB.html.
209. See Excerpt to INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN AIM 2007, GROWTH COMPANY
INVESTOR (Landsbanki, London, U.K.), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.c
om/NR/rdonlyres/3B4D7EF6-0CFD-4DCE-B2FD-7B116D84E766/0/INSTITUTIONA
L_INVESTORS.pdf; see also LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM MARKET STATISTICS: APR.
2007 (2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/statistics/
factsheets/aimmarketstats.htm (follow link to “April 2007”).
210. See Thomas, supra note 184, at 1.
211. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21 (pointing out that while the U.K.
has an institutional investor-focused system, in the U.S. retail investors play a larger
role in securities markets).
212. See, e.g., AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5
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The fact that most AIM companies have not reached a significant
stage in their growth cycle impacts the venue’s liquidity ratio. A
significant number of companies that seek an AIM listing expect to raise
capital in amounts sufficient to allow them, at a later date, to list in a
larger exchange or undergo takeover proceedings. 213 Most of these
companies even rely on post-IPO funding rounds in AIM to raise
sufficient amounts of equity. 214 Hence, AIM firms seldom provide
investors with short-term profits. As investors expect long-term gains
from their participation in AIM companies, they pour considerable
resources into analyzing a firm’s prospects and would loath liquidating
their shares before payoff. 215 Accordingly, AIM shares are not actively
traded. 216

(discussing how retail investors that acquire AIM shares are offered a tax incentive if
they hold their investment for a certain amount of time). This incentive, provided in the
capital gains tax toll, decreases to 50% of the total gain after one year and to 25% after
two years. Id. Private investors generally only acquire AIM shares after an IPO, since
securities in initial public offerings are often totally acquired by institutional investors.
See id. Other fiscal breaks relate to inheritance taxes, enterprise investment schemes,
and venture capital trusts. See Tom Bulford, Should You Invest in AIM?, MONEYWEEK,
Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.moneyweek.com/file/11116/should-you-invest-in-aim.html.
213. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 4. A majority of delistings in AIM are
due to either a listing move to a senior exchange, like the LSE, or company takeover or
reverse takeover proceedings. Bauer points out that only a reduced number of firms delist because their shares have lost considerable value. See id. at 4. It is relevant to note
that AIM’s Rules appear to take particular interest in regulating takeovers and
significant corporate transactions. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules
12-16, at 5-7.
214. See AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5. This
practice, which is customary in AIM, may be compared to the multiple funding rounds
in venture capital investments. See id. The main difference between both types of
funding lies with the absence of typical venture capital restrictions and the reliance on
market mechanisms to govern the relationship between AIM companies and their
investors. Id.
215. See id. Investors in AIM have a longer investment time horizon than investors
in the U.S. The former often take large positions and hold them until they are certain to
obtain a significant return in their investment. See id.
216. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44. During 2006, average trading volumes for
AIM companies were only two percent of NASDAQ companies. Id. This liquidity
constraint is certainly a consequence of AIM investors’ long-term profit goals, as
evidenced by the characteristics of the companies in which they invest. Since these
companies are frequently unable to deliver short term returns, investors focus on
reaping profits after a period of at least twelve months. See AIM in a U.S. Context:
Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5.
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Critics of AIM’s regulatory model point to these liquidity
constraints as a signal of the venue’s imminent collapse. 217 However
adverse low trading volumes might be, AIM provides its companies with
a relatively higher level of liquidity, as compared to other listing venues.
Hypothetically, companies that list their shares in AIM would be more
thinly traded in exchanges such as NASDAQ or the LSE’s Official
List. 218 A study in 2007, comparing firms with a market capitalization
below $450 million, also shows that AIM is at least as liquid as the
LSE’s Official List. 219 Recently, AIM has implemented numerous
measures that could improve the venue’s liquidity ratio, such as the AIM
50, AIM 100, and AIM-All Share indices, AIM index trackers, and
specialized trading platforms such as the SETSmm 220 and PLUS. 221 As
AIM evolves into a more mature market, it must continue to address
liquidity constraints.
The oversight roles of its own regulation service, and that of the
LSE, also play a part in the success of AIM’s model. Both have proven
217. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 6. Liquidity constraints are one of
the main factors that deter the development of vibrant capital markets. Higher liquidity
levels increase trading opportunities by attracting a higher number of listings, thus
increasing market activity. See id. Low liquidity is common in systems with lower
levels of regulatory stringency. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies,
Capital Markets and Securities Law 39 (Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 73, 2006);
Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44.
218. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 7. Since investors in AIM
companies are usually institutional investors seeking long term gains, they are less
pressed to sell their holdings and, thus, benefit less from enhanced liquidity. See Bauer
& Boritz, supra note 142, at 12.
219. See Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, A TAYLOR WESSING
GUIDE (Taylor Wessing, London, U.K.), 2007, at 3, available at http://www.taylorwess
ing.com/website/generator/taylorwessing/content/publications/items/UK/InitialPublicOf
fersAIMforUSCorporations__TWUK__english.en,property=file.pdf.
220. See id. AIM 50, AIM 100 and AIM-All Share are market capitalization
weighted indices tracking the largest 50, 100, and all AIM companies, respectively.
SETSmm is an order book service provided by the LSE, which guarantees two-way
prices for trading parties. See London Stock Exchange, http://www.londonstockexchang
e.com/aim/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
221. See
Quoted
Companies
Alliance,
Guide
to
U.K.
Markets,
http://www.quotedcompaniesalliance.co.uk/market_comparison.asp (last visited Jan.
16, 2008) (comparing AIM and PLUS). PLUS is a self-regulated U.K. market which
tailors its regulation to the needs of both investors and growing companies. Although
PLUS is not meant to be a tool for improving AIM’s liquidity—since to some extent it
is the latter’s competitor—PLUS does contemplate special proceedings for AIM
companies’ cross-listings, which may enhance liquidity for AIM traded shares. Cf. id.
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to be highly responsive regulators, adjusting AIM’s rules promptly and
according to market need. Constant regulatory fine-tuning has allowed
the venue to counter its most mordant critics by expeditiously fixing any
detected glitches. The exchange’s reaction to adverse media reports in
early 2006 concerning cash shells listed on AIM with no real business
purpose exemplifies its vigilance. On March 17, 2006, the exchange set
a deadline for investing companies that had raised at least ₤3 million on
AIM, but had not yet put those funds to any use. 222 Upon expiration of
the deadline, the exchange immediately suspended thirty-eight
companies from trading. 223 Recently, the exchange also introduced a
new rulebook for Nomads to ensure a consistent level of good
practice. 224 Notices published on the exchange’s website tweak AIM’s
rules and regulations process. 225 Twenty-nine different notices have
been published to date (February 2008) and concern all sorts of matters,
including clearing and settlement conducted through the CREST system,
disciplinary procedures, permissible accounting standards, and
amendments to AIM’s Rules for Companies. 226 In February 2007, the
exchange launched a major regulatory overhaul, including issuing the
new rulebook for Nomads, 227 mandating that AIM companies maintain a
website for disclosure purposes, and refining its disciplinary
proceedings. 228

222. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 17: AIM Rules – Reminder of
Investing Company Rules, (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchan
ge.com/NR/rdonlyres/E0B87D50-F0A1-4BD7-ADCD-EAF5942421B2/0/AIMNotice
17.doc.
223. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 10.
224. See Confirmation of New Aim Rules and Feedback on AIM’s Notice 24,
CORPORATE UPDATE (Clifford Chance, London, U.K.), May 2007, available at
http://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/publications/details.aspx?FilterName=@URL
&LangID=UK&contentitemid=12138.
225. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notices, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/For+AIM+Advisers/aimnotices.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
226. See id.
227. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 27: Confirmation of New Rules and
Feedback on AIM Notice 27 (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexch
ange.com/NR/rdonlyres/91B19E7D-550C-440A-BCCA-52A32F1913DB/0/AIMRULE
SFORCOMPANIES_2007.pdf. The new rules enhance the eligibility criteria for
Nomads and lay down core responsibilities. See id.
228. See id.
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1. Listing Process
In contrast with the majority of exchanges worldwide, AIM does
not impose stringent admission requirements on companies seeking
entry to the market. The few objective listing criteria set forth by the
exchange can be complied with easily; admittance simply requires firms
to appoint a Nomad and submit an admission document. 229 Although
these requirements, at first glance, might seem excessively lax, AIM
listings are subject to a safeguard that ensures market integrity and
contributes to the preservation of AIM’s reputation. In the absence of
minimum capitalization, share volume thresholds, and trading track
record requirements, 230 AIM charges Nomads with the task of certifying
firms that request admission. 231 Certification can only be issued after
firms have passed a suitability test designed by AIM and administered
by Nomads. 232 Although Nomads have significant discretion in
determining which companies pass the suitability test, AIM’s Rules for

229. See London Stock Exch., AIM: The World’s Most Successful Growth Market, in
LONDON STOCK EXCH., JOINING AIM: A PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK 4-14 (2007),
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/DBA42382-DCD44966-9733-F6ACB01FBA10/0/JoiningAIMAprofessionalhandbookFinal.pdf.
230. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 7, at 4. The lock-in
provision set forth in AIM’s Rules for Companies partially offset the lack of these
requirements. See id. Under this rule, if a business has not been active and earning
revenue for at least two years, its related parties and employees are locked in as
shareholders. Id. This measure is clearly intended to protect investors from fraudulent
schemes or the use of worthless cash shells. See id.
231. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, sched. 2 (2007),
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/8104E31B-946D49F1-A82B-CC14499B435A/0/AIMNominatedAdviser.pdf [hereinafter AIM Rules for
Nominated Advisers]. AIM’s Rules for Nomads contain a certification model, pursuant
to which Nomads must attest, inter alia, that “the applicant and its securities are
appropriate to be admitted to AIM, having made due and careful enquiry and
considered all relevant matters set out in the AIM Rules for Companies and the AIM
Rules for Nominated Advisers.” Id.
232. See id., sched. 3, at 16. The test imposes certain responsibilities on Nomads
regarding the admission of applicants to AIM. See id. Although such duties are
principles-based, AIM’s Rules suggest a number of actions whose execution is
considered appropriate in assessing an applicant’s suitability. See id. For example,
Nomads are compelled to achieve a “sound understanding” of the applicant’s business.
Id. In order to do so, the Rules recommend measures such as undertaking visits to the
applicant’s site of operations and using external experts to analyze the latter’s business.
See id.
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Nomads mandate a rigorous examination of the applicant’s affairs.233
AIM requires Nomads to soundly understand an applicant’s business
plans, management structure, and financial and legal status before
certifying that a firm is qualified for listing.234
Consequently, the admission process entails considerable legal and
financial due diligence, in addition to a complete review of the relevant
entry documents. 235
In performing their functions as AIM’s
gatekeepers, Nomads ascertain whether a company’s admission will
provide shareholders with real value and enhance the venue’s
reputation. 236 At this juncture, Nomads also determine whether a
company has reached the appropriate stage of its growth cycle to seek an
AIM listing. In cases where listing costs outweigh its benefits and
admittance to AIM is not in the best interests of a company, the Nomad
is advised to refrain from providing certification. 237 Nomads have
significant incentives to ensure that only suitable companies gain access
to the market. 238 A thorough review during the entry process generally
spans three to six months. 239
Suitable AIM applicants must complete and submit an admission
document containing all relevant information about the firm. 240 The
applicant must supply detailed information, including a description of
the company’s business, financial information, risk factors, legal
structure and material contracts, relevant legal proceedings, and any
233. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 97; Colin Aaronson, Role of the Nominated
Adviser in an AIM Flotation, in LONDON STOCK EXCH., JOINING AIM: A PROFESSIONAL
HANDBOOK 19-28 (2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonl
yres/DBA42382-DCD4-4966-9733-F6ACB01FBA10/0/JoiningAIMAprofessionalhand
bookFinal.pdf. It appears that a certain degree of consensus in the Nomad industry
exists as to the standards for measuring companies undergoing the suitability test.
Rousseau refers to some areas usually verified by the Nomads, which include
management composition, corporate governance, business viability, market potential,
and working capital. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 97. Aaronson describes the way
in which Nomads should inquire into each of these areas. See Aaronson, supra, at 1928.
234. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, supra note 231, sched. 3, at 16.
235. See id. AIM’s Rules determine that Nomads must oversee the due diligence
process to ensure that it is conducted adequately. See id.
236. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 19-20.
237. See id. at 20.
238. For instance, Nomads have reputational incentives to perform this task
diligently. See infra Part III.B.4.
239. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 7.
240. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3.
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other information “which it reasonably considers necessary to enable its
investors to form a full understanding of the assets, liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the applicant and its
securities for which admission is being sought.” 241 If the applicant
specializes in a particular field, such as mining or technology, the
admission document should contain an expert’s report providing
investors sufficient information to make sound investment decisions. 242
In the case of investment companies, managers must attest to at least
three years of performance data experience. 243 The admission document
must also contain directors’ statements assuming responsibility for the
veracity of all supplied information and certifying the adequacy of the
firm’s working capital. 244 Importantly, Nomads participate in the
drafting process and verify proper completion of the admission
documents. 245 Nomads’ examination of the entry documents serves the
purpose of a regulatory review, not unlike the one conducted by the
U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) when admitting a company
to the Official List. Applicants must make their admission document
publicly available at least one month before admittance to AIM.246
Additionally, the listing process requires the issuance of a pre-admission
document at least ten business days prior to admission, in which basic
company information is provided. 247 The exchange forwards the
information to its Regulatory Information Service, which then publishes
an announcement on AIM’s website and adds the applicant to the AIM
listing. 248
If an applicant seeks to make a public share offering concurrently
with admission to AIM, it must draft and circulate a prospectus instead
of the aforementioned admission document. 249 The prospectus must
241. See id., sched. 2(k), at 45; see also Aaronson, supra note 233, at 26 (detailing
that applicants must also reveal information about key personnel, firm policy on
corporate governance, share option and dividend policies, an indication of substantial
shareholders, and a summary of tax issues).
242. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 109.
243. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 9.
244. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3.
245. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 104.
246. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3.
247. See id., Rule 2, at 3.
248. See id.
249. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 6. The public nature of an offering is
determined by examining the number of non-qualified investors to which the offer is
addressed. Qualified investors are defined as those authorized to execute investment
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comply with the more comprehensive FSA Prospectus Rules, including
the provisions introduced after the European Prospectus Directive.
Unlike the admission document, the prospectus is subject to regulatory
review by the FSA, which acts as the U.K.’s listing authority. 250
However, AIM share issuances—both concurrent with and subsequent
to admission—commonly involve private placements, in which a
restricted number of investors are invited to acquire shares in the
applicant firm, thus eliminating the need to publish a prospectus. 251 This
comports with AIM’s reliance on a large, qualified investor base. As a
result, few AIM applications have necessitated the issuance of a
prospectus. 252
Private placements gives rise to numerous advantages for AIM
firms and investors alike. Issuer companies benefit from a faster,
cheaper equity-raising process, as compared to a public offering.
Investors in these placements have greater control over their investments
and can more readily assess the risks associated with the issuing
company. 253 Family firms might also profit from private placements.
Controlling insiders could negotiate terms with prospective investors,
forfeiting some benefits of private control in exchange for increased
capital. 254
As the AIM market matures and shifts its focus to larger firms, it is
likely that applicants and listed companies alike will gravitate away
from private placements and toward public offerings, which involve the
business and include financial institutions, mutual and pension funds, large
corporations, and individuals registered with the FSA. See id. at 6. If an applicant is
expected to have more than 100 non-qualified investors, it must publish a prospectus
instead of an admission document. Other exceptions to the publication of a prospectus
relate to the size of the issue (roughly less than $3 million) and the minimum
consideration to be paid by any person for offered securities (roughly $65,000). See
Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, supra note 221, at 8.
250. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 87 (U.K.) (establishing a
compulsory review process, in which the FSA verifies that the submitted prospectus
contains all required information); see, e.g., Fin. Servs. Auth. Handbook, Prospectus
Rules, 2008, S.I. 2008/1, R. 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 (U.K.), available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PR/5/3#D66 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
251. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 110.
252. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 6.
253. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 27.
254. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., TAKING AIM (2007). A recent survey conducted by
Baker Tilly shows that a high percentage of family firms consider AIM to be a fairly
attractive option for raising capital. Id. However, no studies have been conducted on
the specific relation between AIM private placements and family firms going public.
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drafting of a prospectus. 255 In fact, some U.S. law firms have already
struck marketing deals with AIM, emphasizing the prospectus-based
IPO process as the ideal gateway to the market. 256 Figure 4 contains a
portrayal of the admission process for firms undergoing private
placements and public offerings.
FIGURE 4
AIM ADMISSION PROCESS
Private Placements

Source: AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note
115, at 4.

255. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 4. Recent figures show that the AIM
market is indeed maturing and granting entry to ever larger firms. See id.
256. See HAYNES & BOONE, THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (2006) (on
file with author); see also infra Part III.C (providing more information about these
alleged marketing deals).
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Public Offerings

Source: HAYNES & BOONE, supra note 256.
The AIM listing process also features fast-track admission for socalled “quoted applicants.” 257 This streamlined process exempts AIM
applicants already listed in certain overseas exchanges from submitting
an admission document. 258 Quoted applicants are deemed acceptable for
an AIM listing due to their track record in one of several recognized
listing venues, dubbed AIM Designated Markets. These venues include
the NYSE, NASDAQ, Euronext, the Deutsche Börse, and the UKLA
Official List, among others. 259 Under fast-track admission, quoted
applicants must issue a pre-admission document, which is more detailed
than the one required under the standard listing process. 260 Under this
257. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, at 28. Quoted applicants are
defined as issuers that trade their securities in AIM Designated Markets for at least
eighteen months prior to an AIM admittance. Id.; see LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM
DESIGNATED MARKETS, available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyr
es/A1DF2948-5726-4075-B8C5-46E2EECF9353/0/AIMDesignatedMarkets1.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008) (listing the AIM Designated Markets).
258. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM DESIGNATED MARKETS, supra note 257.
259. Id.
260. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 105. Rousseau points out that quoted
applicants must also comply with certain technical requirements, such as conforming
their financial statements to GAAP or, in the alternative, IAS. Id.
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expedited process, applicants must still retain the services of a Nomad
and pass the suitability test administered prior to AIM admittance. 261
After the applicant submits the required admission documentation,
the Nomad certification of suitability, and pays the AIM listing fee,
admission is complete, and the exchange will issue a dealing notice
granting entry to the market. 262 AIM’s initial listing fee is fixed, unlike
other exchanges such as NASDAQ, which calculates the fee based upon
the aggregate number of shares being listed. 263 AIM has set its initial
listing fee around ₤4535 (roughly $7300), which is significantly lower
than a NASDAQ listing ($100,000 - $150,000 for a listing in the Global
Select segment and $50,000 - $70,000 for a listing in the Capital Market
segment), 264 but higher than the fee charged by the Entry Standard
Segment of the Deutsche Börse (roughly $2000 for private placements
and $1000 with a prospectus). 265 Listing fee included, the total cost of
an AIM listing appears to be lower than a NASDAQ listing. Table 3
shows a comparison of direct initial listing costs (expressed in U.S.
dollars), based on the premise of a company seeking to launch a $50
million IPO on both AIM and NASDAQ. 266

261. See generally Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142; ROUSSEAU, supra note 142.
This process is expected to last anywhere from four to six weeks, a significant reduction
from the three to six months for non-quoted applicants under the standard process. See
Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142; ROUSSEAU, supra note 142.
262. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 5-6, at 4. The dealing
notice is made public through the exchange’s Regulatory Information Service. Id.
263. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, supra note 123, at 5.
264. Id.
265. See Entry Standard: Tailormade Capital Market Access for Small-Caps and
Mid-Caps (Deutsche Börse Group, Frankfurt/Main, F.R.G.), Nov. 2007, available at
http://deutscheboerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/pu
blic_files/10_downloads/33_going_being_public/50_others/entry_standard_broschuere
_06.9.pdf.
266. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 4; Bauer & Boritz, supra
note 142, at 7. While the cost difference in this chart is significant, other estimates
show an AIM IPO posting around $922,000 in costs, as opposed to $2.4 million in
NASDAQ. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 4; Bauer & Boritz,
supra note 142, at 7.
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TABLE 3
AIM VS NASDAQ—DIRECT INITIAL LISTING COSTS

DIRECT INITIAL LISTING COSTS
AIM IPO

NASDAQ IPO

Item
Nomad / Broker
Fee
Corporate Finance
Fee
Company Counsel
Nomad Counsel
Accounting Fees
AIM Fee
Registration Fee

Cost
$2,000,000

Total

$3,426,300

Item
Underwriting Fee

Cost
$3,500,000

$500,000

Legal Fees

$500,000

$262,000
$300,000
$312,000
$7,300
$45,000

Miscellaneous Fees
Printing Fees
Accounting Fees
NASDAQ Listing Fee
SEC and NASD
Registration Fees
Total

$145,000
$75,000
$65,000
$100,000
$107,000
$4,472,000

Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131.
A significant cost difference between AIM and NASDAQ also
appears to exist regarding ongoing compliance for listed companies. As
aforementioned, the exchange-regulated nature of AIM allows it to issue
a set of rules, imposing low disclosure and governance hurdles upon its
listed firms. 267 The AIM rulebook contains a meager forty-five rules, of
which roughly twenty-eight concern a company’s ongoing obligations
after listing. 268 Most of these rules seek to ensure timely and adequate
disclosure of all relevant information to the marketplace. Other rules
oblige companies to retain a Nomad at all times and pay listing fees.269
Table 4 compares direct ongoing costs for AIM and NASDAQ firms
based on the premise of an already completed $50 million IPO.

267.
268.
269.

See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 10-38, at 5-11.
Id.
Id.
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TABLE 4
AIM VS NASDAQ—DIRECT ONGOING LISTING COSTS

DIRECT ONGOING LISTING COSTS
AIM
Item
Nomad Fee
AIM Annual Fee
Accountants
Total

NASDAQ
Cost
$90,000
$7,300
$50,000
$147,300

Item
SOX Compliance
NASDAQ Annual
Fee

Cost
$3,500,000
$17,500

Total

$3,517,500

Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131.

2. Disclosure Requirements Following Admission
AIM’s regulatory model presupposes proper communication and
continuous disclosure of information flowing from listed companies to
the marketplace. 270 Since AIM’s investor base is predominantly
institutional and private placements are commonplace, listed companies
feature a small number of investors with whom they maintain tight
links. 271 Even though AIM’s ongoing rules for listed companies may
appear lax prima facie, disclosure levels are close to optimal for a
sophisticated investor base that demands adequate information. Nomads
play an important role in maintaining AIM’s market integrity, as they
liaison between companies and investors and essentially advise AIM
companies as to the timing, form, and content of any disclosures that
must be made to the market. 272 With Nomad assistance, AIM firms can
reduce compliance costs by setting apart relevant information—which
should be disclosed—from immaterial information. 273 Thus, Nomads
fulfill their general mandate that disclosed information is not misleading
270. See London Stock Exch., AIM: The World’s Most Successful Growth Market,
supra note 229, at 13.
271. IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 5 (“AIM is predominantly an
institutional market, which means its investor relationships can be structured more
efficiently than those of a market where shares are mainly traded retail.”).
272. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 34.
273. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 105 (“Since the Nomad is acting as
regulator, this framework can reduce the risk of non-disclosure of important
information by issuers for good reasons.”).
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or deceptive and that a company does not omit “anything likely to affect
the import of such information.” 274
A company listed in AIM is obliged to disclose price sensitive, nonpublic information. 275 AIM’s definition of price sensitive information—
any new developments which, if made public, would be likely to lead to
a substantial movement in the price of a company’s AIM securities 276 —
is coupled with a list of defining criteria regarding the area in which
such developments may occur: (1) financial condition, (2) sphere of
activity, (3) business performance, and (4) expectations as to business
performance. 277
AIM adopted this definition pursuant to the
implementation of the European Directive on Insider Dealing and
Market Manipulation (dubbed the “Market Abuse Directive”),
applicable in part to AIM, despite its condition as an exchange regulated
venue. 278 This extensive application also affects AIM’s insider trading
regime. 279 AIM companies must work closely with their Nomads,
charged with ensuring market awareness “of all information that needs
to be in the public domain,” to determine which information is price
sensitive and merits disclosure. 280

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 10, at 5.
See id., Rule 11, at 5.
See id.
Id.
See Transposition Note for Directive (EC) 2003/6, The Market Abuse
Directive, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/B/MAD_tn240205.pdf.
The issuance of several instruments, including the Financial Services and Markets Act
Regulations 2005, completed the adoption of the Market Abuse Directive in the U.K.
Upon implementation, the scope of the Market Abuse Directive—which applied only to
regulated markets—was extended to cover AIM. Id.
279. See Market Abuse, The EU Directive on Insider Dealing and Market
Manipulation, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Goliath/Thomson-Gale Info. Serv.), Feb. 3,
2005. Indeed, the main market abuse offences contemplated under the Directive are
deemed applicable to AIM-listed companies, but other provisions, such as the issuance
of insider lists, are not. See id. AIM’s rules specify:
[S]ecurities of an AIM company may not be traded by its directors or applicable
employees during a trading close period. In this context, applicable employees are
those employees likely to be in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information
in relation to the company because of their employment with the company . . . .
Nomads will insist that an AIM company adopt an insider-trading policy to comply
with the above.

ROBERT BRANT ET AL., LEXPERT 500, AIM: GATEWAY TO EUROPEAN MARKETS 6-7
(2005), available at http://www.lexpert.ca/500/lb.php?id=91.
280. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 29.
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AIM rules also categorize four types of corporate transactions that
require disclosure: (1) substantial transactions, (2) related party
transactions, (3) reverse takeovers, and (4) disposals resulting in a
fundamental change of business. 281 The exchange designed specific
“class tests” for each transaction type, 282 addressing factors such as
gross assets, profits, or turnover ratios to determine transaction size and
relevancy. For instance, the Gross Assets Test computes the gross assets
of the acquisition or disposition contemplated by the relevant transaction
over those of the AIM company, while the Turnover Test similarly
computes the ratio of the turnover attributable to the contemplated
transaction to that of the AIM company overall. 283 Substantial
transactions, then, are defined as those that exceed a threshold of 10% in
any of the class tests. Related party transactions 284 and reverse
takeovers 285 set forth additional criteria. AIM firms engaging in any of
these transactions must also provide specific information, supplementing
the general duty to disclose. 286 The aggregation of transactions executed
over a period of twelve months prior to the latest operation completes
this set of AIM rules. 287
Though less stringent than most stock exchange venues, AIM
requires companies to periodically disclose financial information. 288 For
example, AIM companies must prepare a semi-annual report, containing
a balance sheet, income and cash flow statements, and comparative
figures for the corresponding period in the previous year. 289 Companies
must also prepare, publish, and send to shareholders audited annual
accounts within six months of the conclusion of the fiscal year.290
Unlike the requirements set forth under SOX, executive officers of AIM

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 12-15, at 5-6.
See id., sched. 3, at 20-21.
See id.
See id., Rule 13, at 5-6.
See id., Rules 10-11, at 5. If a takeover transaction does not meet class test
thresholds, a company must account for fundamental changes in business or board and
voting control, or in the case of investing companies, any substantial departures from
initial investing strategies. See id.
286. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 118 (identifying additional information
needed, such as the identities of related parties).
287. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 16, at 7.
288. See id., Rule 11, at 5.
289. See id., Rule 18, at 7-8.
290. See id., Rule 19, at 8.
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companies are not called upon to certify financial reports. 291 Critics
proclaiming AIM’s regulatory laxity often reference the absence of
quarterly reports or executive certification of financial reports. 292 To the
extent that institutional investors acquiring AIM securities exert close
scrutiny, given their long-term expectations and close relationship with
issuers, and the Nomad’s involvement counteracting AIM leniency, this
negative assessment is unjustified. 293 AIM rounds out its disclosure
requirements with such miscellaneous information as: deals undertaken
by directors, relevant changes to significant shareholdings, 294 changes in
board composition, material changes between actual performance and
profit forecasts, resignations, dismissals and appointments of Nomads,
and admission to trading in any other exchange. 295
The exchange’s Regulatory Information Service channels the
required disclosure information—including any data specifically
requested by the exchange. 296 Recent amendments to the AIM rules
obligate every company to establish and maintain a website containing
financial and corporate information 297 before August 26, 2007. 298
Multiple private parties already offer website services specifically
designed for AIM companies. 299
291.
292.
293.

See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Blackwell & Gapper, supra note 149, at 8.
Nomads must ensure that AIM companies comply with ongoing disclosure
requirements and employ due care in ensuring that disclosed information is accurate.
294. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 25: Changes to the Disclosure of
Significant Shareholders (Nov. 11, 2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchang
e.com/NR/rdonlyres/37156CEB-E10C-4551-A2B0-E6BE3AB38047/0/AIMNotice25.p
df. This requirement can be seen as a direct consequence of the implementation of the
Transparency Directive in the UK. Although most of the Transparency Directive did
not affect AIM, disclosure of relevant shareholding was retained. Id.; see also London
Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 26: Update on AIM Notice 25 (Disclosure of Significant
Shareholders) and Discussion of Other Legislative Changes (Including Electronic
Communications) (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/N
R/rdonlyres/A1DF2CCC-8530-4328-9A8B-3EF44DD45566/0/AIMNotice25_FINAL_
pdf.
295. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 17, at 7.
296. Id., Rules 22-23, at 9. The exchange is entitled to request any kind of
information from AIM listed companies and to mandate the publication of such data.
See id.
297. See id., Rule 26, at 9.
298. See id.
299. See, e.g., AIM Compliance, http://www.aimcompliance.com/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2008).
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3. Corporate Governance for AIM Firms
While AIM regulates, to some extent, disclosure requirements, the
exchange leaves unaddressed corporate governance. AIM firms are not
legally bound to comply with the provisions of the U.K.’s Combined
Code on Corporate Governance, 300 nor does the exchange require that its
companies create audit committees or appoint independent directors. 301
Nevertheless, market pressures offset the lack of prescriptive regulation
and drive firms to voluntarily adopt corporate governance provisions.
AIM’s investor base is mainly composed of sophisticated
institutions that delve profoundly into the business of a firm before
investing in its shares. 302 Institutional investors would not take interest
in a company lacking the necessary mechanisms to ensure adequate
corporate governance. 303
To allure prospective investors, AIM
companies often integrate various corporate governance mechanisms
and disclose these policies in their admission documents and
websites. 304 Nomads also commonly persuade their clients to adopt high
corporate governance standards. 305

300. See David Robbins, Corporate Governance and AIM, in AIM: A CLOSER LOOK
(Media Planet/London Stock Exch., London, Eng.), Apr. 20, 2007, at 12, available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/FAD7D047-6B52-4A00-9AE69F0526F881DC/0/AIMAcloserlook.pdf.
The Combined Code incorporates
recommendations from a number of authorities, including the Cadbury report, the
Greenbury report, the Smith report, the Turnbull report, and the Higgs report. See
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf.
301. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 14-15, at 6. However,
some transactions require shareholder approval, such as in a “reverse takeover” or a
disposal of corporate assets exceeding 75% percent in any of the class tests. Id.
302. See supra notes 270-74.
303. Monitoring and Taking Action on Financial Performance, Corporate
Governance and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 204. In demanding the
introduction of corporate governance provisions for AIM firms, a major institutional
investor stressed that “the main principles of good corporate governance embodied in
the (Combined Code) are applicable to listed companies of all sizes and stages of
development.” Id.
304. See, e.g., Supporta, Investor Relations, http://www.supportaplc.com/investorrelations/corporate-governance/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2008); Zenergy Power, Investor
Relations, http://www.zenergypower.com/investors/corporate_governance (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008).
305. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 35.
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Since no compulsory rules exist, AIM companies have a certain
degree of flexibility regarding the mechanics of their internal
governance structures. Nevertheless, investors’ and Nomads’ vision of
best practice largely constrains firm autonomy. Any sub-optimal
corporate governance regime will undoubtedly negatively impact a
firm’s ability to raise equity or maintain continuity as an AIM-listed
company. 306 AIM firms are thus expected to comply with the Combined
Code or, if some provisions are considered detrimental or overly costly,
justify non-compliance. However, the rules promulgated by the
Combined Code are generally intended to govern the affairs of larger
corporations (i.e., those listed in the U.K.’s Official List) and might not
be fit for the smaller companies listed on AIM. Combined Code
adherence may lead to an unnecessary increase in compliance costs for
firms that can ill afford to waste resources abiding by stiff governance
processes.
The Corporate Governance Guidelines for AIM Companies,
published by the Quoted Company Alliance (“QCA”), exemplify recent
efforts to address the drawbacks of Combined Code application to AIM
firms. 307 The QCA guidelines are tailored to small firms and represent
the consensus view on best practices by the AIM advisory and investor
community. 308 Overall, the guidelines do not stray far from the
principles set out in the Combined Code, but they do adjust the specific
governance mechanisms to the needs of small-caps. For instance, the
guidelines underscore the importance of having two independent
directors, and further suggest that different individuals should act as
Chairman of the Board and CEO. 309 The guidelines also advocate
306. See infra Part III.B.4. It must be stressed that Nomads, charged with assessing
the continuous suitability of firms listed in AIM, could single out any company which
does not abide by high standards of governance and disclosure. Such a company would
surely be excluded or suspended from AIM.
307. See The Quoted Companies Alliance, Publications, http://www.quotedcompan
iesalliance.co.uk/guidance_booklets.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (offering guidance
booklets, including the Corporate Governance Guidelines for AIM Companies). This
not-for-profit organization claims to protect the interests of the smaller quoted company
sector. Id.
308. See Joining AIM: A Field Guide for Potential Applicants to the AIM Market of
the London Stock Exchange, NEWS & INSIGHTS (DLA Piper UK LLP, London, U.K.),
Nov. 29, 2007, at 8, http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/detail.aspx?pub=2867
309. See What Additional Responsibilities and Obligations Arise for Directors of
AIM Companies?, BRIEFING NOTES (Manches, LLP, London, U.K.), Aug. 2006,
http://www.manches.com/downloads/briefings/AIM_Director_Responsibilities.pdf
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proportionally-sized remuneration, auditing, and nomination committees
composed of non-executive directors. 310 Moreover, the QCA guidelines
recommend that the board of directors ensure satisfactory shareholder
dialogue and conduct an annual review of the firm’s internal governance
controls. 311
Following QCA’s initiative, the U.K.’s National Association of
Pension Funds (“NAPF”) published its own set of guidelines in March
2007. The NAPF’s Policy and Voting Guidelines for AIM Companies is
consistent with QCA’s previous efforts to create a customized
governance code, and even complement the latter’s guidelines. 312
However, some overlapping provisions exist—particularly in regard to
director independence and board committees—which could create
confusion for companies following both sets of principles. 313 Since the
NAPF guidelines do not cover every aspect of internal governance,
some recommend initial application of the Combined Code “in a way in
which is appropriate to [an AIM firm’s] circumstances and its size.” 314
The guidelines also focus on increased disclosure standards,
remuneration arrangements, pre-emption, and senior independent
directors. 315
AIM’s unique system of corporate governance, which relies on
market pressures and incentive structures, has hitherto produced positive
results. 316 To date, a majority of AIM companies comply with the
[hereinafter Manches, LLP].
310. See The Practical Law Company – Corporate, Remuneration committee terms
of reference: AIM, http://corporate.practicallaw.com/7-202-2501 (last visited Jan. 14,
2008) (stating that remuneration committees should contain “at least two members but
companies with larger boards may want to increase this”); Public Companies Update
(Charles Russell LLP, London, U.K.), Sept. 2005, at 5, http://www.cr-law.co.uk/resourc
es/pdf/Public_Companies_Update_0905.pdf.
311. See Manches, LLP, supra note 309.
312. See Corporate Governance Policy: Policy and Voting Guidelines for AIM
Companies (NAPF, London, U.K.), Mar. 2007, at 3, http://www.napf.co.uk/documentar
chive.asp (follow “Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Corporate Governance” hyperlink).
In order to issue its own principles, NAPF consulted the QCA to assist consistency
between both sets of guidelines. Id.
313. See id.
314. NAPF Corporate Governance Policy for AIM-Listed Companies, CORPORATE
BRIEFING (Travers Smith, London, U.K.), May 2007, http://www.traverssmith.com/?pid
=24&level=2.
315. See id.
316. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 15. According to a 2006 survey,
AIM investors see improvement in the level of corporate governance within the market.
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provisions of the Combined Code or QCA’s Guidelines. 317 Most of
these companies implement governance regimes customized to their
particular characteristics. 318
The tailoring procedure decreases
compliance costs while simultaneously signals to the market
implementation of best practice corporate governance standards. Again,
the Nomad’s advisory role is central during this fine-tuning process. 319
A Nomad’s knowledge of market trends and its relationship with
institutional investors helps to prescribe the optimal level of corporate
governance for AIM firms. 320
4. The Nominated Adviser
Without doubt, the comprehensive role of the Nominated Adviser is
the strongest pillar of AIM’s regulatory model. Assigned the two-fold
task of assessing a firm’s AIM suitability and advising disclosure and
corporate governance compliance, Nomads preserve the integrity and
reputation of the market. 321 As a liaison between listed companies and
the exchange’s authorities, 322 Nomads simultaneously play the part of
gatekeeper, adviser, and ultimately, regulator, of AIM. Not surprisingly,
applicants for Nomad status must clear a rigorous screening process.
The exchange sets a high financial and legal standard for Nomad
admission. 323 In addition to the prescriptive criteria, the exchange also
See id. However, 14% of AIM investors have clear doubts about whether AIM’s
system of corporate governance is in accordance with normal market standards. Id.
317. See David Robbins, Corporate Governance and AIM, AIM: A CLOSER LOOK
(Baker Tilly, London, U.K.), Apr. 2007, http://www.bakertilly.co.uk/default.aspx?page
=2670; Emilio Cattaneo, Equity Capital Markets Alternative Routes to Raising Capital
(CFS Partners, London, U.K.), Feb. 2007, http://www.cavedatos.org.ve/download/cdt_4
42.pdf; A Review of Corporate Governance Adoption with Aim Companies in the South
West (Grant Thornton, London, U.K.), Dec. 2005, http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/port
als/grantthornton/documents/3-aim-corporate-governance-.pdf.
318. See WHY U.S. (AND NON-EUROPEAN) COMPANIES NEED AIM, supra note 204,
at 8.
319. Id. Nomads allow corporate governance to be adjusted “to ensure the most
critical risks were contained, while ensuring that management time was not wasted on
over-rigid control of the wrong parts of a business.” Id.
320. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 35.
321. See id. at 22.
322. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, supra note 231, Rule 19, at 9.
323. Id., Rule 2, at 3. Nomad applicants must (i) have practiced corporate finance
for a period of at least two years, (ii) have acted in at least three relevant transactions
(as defined by AIM rules), and (iii) employ at least four executives that meet AIM

2008

THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET

317

considers the applicant’s reputation and its commercial and regulatory
performance. 324
AIM created the Nomad figure to advise small firms that lacked the
experience to properly function as listed companies. 325 In addition to
this consulting role, the exchange decided to outsource the responsibility
for firm compliance of market rules to these entities. 326 By devolving
part of its regulatory authority to Nomads, AIM succeeded in ensuring
that their advice—albeit non-compulsory—would be closely followed
by public companies. 327 The exchange also afforded these entities full
discretionary powers to determine whether a company was unsuitable to
maintain its AIM listing. Nomads can easily single out and remove
rogue firms that refuse to abide by proper standards of governance and
disclosure. 328 As the best positioned agent to detect substandard
behavior, Nomads are justifiably charged with preserving the integrity
and reputation of AIM by overseeing the firms that they advise. 329
The adequacy of Nomads as AIM’s regulators and gatekeepers
could be challenged on the grounds that these entities have a vested
interest in the firms they counsel. 330 A unique incentive structure,

standards for adequacy. Id.
324. See id., Rule 3, at 3-4.
325. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 18.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 8. Each Nomad must charge at least two qualified members of its
staff to oversee each company. See id.
328. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 40, at 12. In practice,
however, Nomads retain no real power to impose sanctions upon listed firms. If any
company does not abide by acceptable corporate governance principles without
justification, the Nomad notifies the AIM Regulation Department, which may in turn
remove the firm’s listed status or impose any other applicable sanction. AIM may
adduce any number of reasons, including the need to protect the market’s reputation or
to safeguard investors. See id. (discussing AIM’s need to protect the market’s
reputation); Aaronson, supra note 233, at 8 (discussing AIM’s need to safeguard
investors).
329. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 19-20. Nomads preserve AIM’s reputation
by ensuring not only that a company is suitable for admittance, but also that its
subsequent behavior does not have a negative impact on the market. See id.
330. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 8. Some are wary about the Nomads’
relationship with the firms they advise. The LSE is supposed to have a team of analysts
constantly monitoring these advisers. Bauer and Boritz argue that one could consider
that this vested interest causes “sub-optimal information quality and investors to be
misled.” The authors then give several reasons for the unlikelihood of this scenario. See
id.
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however, steers Nomads’ performance. Nomads are liable for improper
reporting by their supervised companies 331 and subject to investor
lawsuits if investors are misled. 332 A Nomad’s considerable reputational
capital complements this set of negative incentives. Like traditional
gatekeepers, Nomads build their reputational capital by servicing clients
over prolonged periods of time, and ultimately vouch for the suitability
of AIM companies and the accuracy of their market disclosures.333
Nomads bear a disproportionate loss from permitting or negligently
overlooking any transgressions on behalf of their supervised companies.
Currently active Nomads, including highly reputed firms like Morgan
Stanley, Citigroup, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, would suffer
considerably for sub-optimal performance.
Commentators still criticize that some Nomads are “as small and
speculative as the companies they float.” 334 Consequently, the exchange
must still constantly supervise to ensure its “self-regulation system”
functions properly. Accordingly, AIM continuously reviews Nomad
activities to verify due diligence. 335 AIM rules also contain a number of
measures to prevent conflicts of interest between a Nomad and listed
companies, as well as to guarantee the former’s independence. 336
Advisers that fail to abide by market standards and practices may be
subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions, including removal of
Qualified Executive status, fines, censure motions, and expulsion from
AIM. 337 Although few entities have been levied the most severe

331. See ROBERT BRANT ET AL., supra note 279. For instance, misstatements or
omissions in an admission document can lead to civil or criminal liability for both the
AIM applicant and its Nomad under the Financial Services and Markets Act. See id.
332. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 9 (“The Nomad bears the risk of
improper reporting and lawsuits for failing to uphold a proper duty of care to all
investors. Investors have legal recourse to pursue damages from the Nomads, the
regulator of the shares, if they have been misled into making a poor investment.”).
333. See Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48, at 11 (explaining the reputational
incentives of gatekeepers).
334. See Business: AIM Changes, BRIEFINGS (Mischon de Reya, London, U.K.),
Dec. 2006, http://www.mishcon.com/news/briefings/docs/briefing_176.aspx.
335. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors, supra note 231, pt. 3, at 11-12.
336. See id., Rule 21, at 9. According to Rule 21, these entities must be able to
show sufficient independence from their clients “such that there is no reasonable basis
for impugning the nominated adviser’s independence.” Id.
337. See id., Rules 27, 29, at 11.
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penalties, the exchange has demonstrated willingness to sanction
misbehaving Nomads when appropriate. 338
C. AIM—Going Forward
Thus far, AIM has adapted to the shifting conditions of modern
economic systems, allowing it to become a dominant player in the
market for small firms with a high growth potential, as the performance
statistics in Figure 5 corroborate.

FIGURE 5
AIM ADMISSIONS, MONEY RAISED AND MARKET VALUE (1995-2006)

Source: BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254.
Still, as it faces increasing competition from both sides of the
Atlantic, AIM will have to be more responsive to preserve its privileged
position. Within the European Union, fledging alternative markets such
as Alternext, Mercato Expandi, Entry Segment and First North, while
338. See Recent Disciplinary Action on AIM, London Stock Exchange,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/cooverview/corpad/recentdisciplina
ryactiononaim12.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).

320

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

still at an embryonic stage and not a current threat, 339 could pose a
challenge to AIM in the future. AIM must also compete with the lowertier segments of well-established U.S. exchanges, such as NASDAQ’s
Capital Market Segment and NYSE Arca, which offer special conditions
for small-caps and benefit from such venues’ higher liquidity.340 AIM
might also face competition within the U.K., specifically from the PLUS
and OFEX trading platforms. 341 Table 5 compares AIM’s admission
requirements with those established by some of these other exchanges.
In order to compete successfully with these venues, AIM must
focus on several areas. For instance, AIM must constantly adjust its
rules to fit investor needs and counter negative market trends. Recent
polls show that most AIM market participants consider its system of
self-regulation to be effective. 342 Most firms even point out that listing
on AIM adds to their credibility as publicly-held companies. Table 6
provides details of a survey of 150 AIM-listed firms ascribing
advantages of an AIM listing.

339.
340.

See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 3.
See Alistair MacDonald, Rivals are Chasing AIM, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007,
at C5 (reporting that a third American competitor may soon enter the race). The
American Stock Exchange has requested SEC permission to set up a low-tier market
named The American Platform. This segment is designed for companies with a market
capitalization of less than $50 million. Id.
341. The OFEX market operates at the lowest level of market capitalization and is
not considered to be a direct competitor of AIM. See Incademy Investor Education,
http://www.incademy.com/courses/How-the-stock-market-works/Why-do-companieslist-on-the-Stock-Exchange/5/1014/10002 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). However, it is
undeniable that certain overlap exists between AIM and OFEX, which could lead to
future competition. See, e.g., London & Pacific Healthcare, Inc. Announces Initial
Acquisition; Established Corporate Finance Firm to Create Additional Value and
Expand Global Reach, MARKET WIRE, Mar. 8, 2007 (providing an example of a
company, PSG Solutions Plc, which moved from OFEX to AIM).
342. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 15. The survey, conducted among
AIM companies and investors, shows that most described AIM’s model as “very” or
“fairly” effective. Although some investors would like to raise AIM’s regulatory
stringency, they are also of the opinion that this would reduce the number of companies
listing in the market. This, again, may be seen as a response to the slowdown in overall
performance during 2006. Cf. id.
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TABLE 5
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALL-CAP EXCHANGES
COMPARATIVE ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
European Alternative Markets
AIM

Alternext

Entry
Segment

U.S. Markets
Mercato
Expandi

NASDAQ

NASDAQ
CM

Minimum
public float

No minimum
requirement

At least US$
3.2 million
(unless
private
placement)

No
minimum
requirement

At least
10% of
equity

400 shareholders;
minimum
market
value
between
US $8-20
million

At least 300
shareholders

Initial equity
required

No minimum
requirement

No minimum
requirement

No
minimum
requirement

No
minimum
requirement

US $0-30
million
(depending
on listing
route)

US $5
million

Market
capitalization

No minimum
requirement

No minimum
requirement

No
minimum
requirement

At least US
$1.3
million

At least US
$75 million

At least US
$50 million

Trading
history

No minimum
requirement

At least 2
years

At least 1
year

At least 2
years

0-2 years
(depending
on listing
route)

1 year

Profitability

No minimum
requirement

Profitable is
strongly
recommended

No
minimum
requirement

Last net
earning and
turnover
thresholds

No
minimum
requirement

No
minimum
requirement

Accounting
standards

UK
GAAP/IFRS/US
GAAP

National
accounting
standards of
Member
State/IFRS

National
GAAP/IFRS

US GAAP

US GAAP

Source: Grant Thornton New Markets Guide 2006 343
343.

GRANT NORTON, NEW MARKETS GUIDE (2006).
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TABLE 6
ADVANTAGES OF AN AIM LISTING
A SURVEY OF 150 AIM FIRMS
Advantage

% of firms claiming a benefit

Added to the company’s credibility

85%

Provided long-term growth potential

82%

Provided access to institutions

81%

Provided the company London profile

79%

Provided access to informed shareholders

71%

Facilitated acquisitions

57%

Provided company control over its future

54%

Provided access to venture capital fund

44%

Source: BOARD ET AL., supra note 75.
A majority of AIM firms, however, posit that standards and
regulation should tighten as the market matures in order to improve
investor confidence. 344 Going forward, AIM must also continue its
unremitting oversight of Nomads and listed firms, improve its liquidity
constraints, and increase its international issuer base. Improvements in
these areas are fundamental if AIM expects to mature into a deeper
market, where larger companies can raise equity and benefit from
enhanced liquidity.
AIM is already in the process of increasing the number of
international companies admitted to trading. An aggressive marketing
campaign conducted simultaneously in different continents has not only
been highly rewarding, but underscores AIM’s impressive results over
the past few years. AIM marketing also benefits from alliances struck

344.

See id.
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with law firms and investment companies. 345 Figure 6 shows the
composition of AIM’s international company base.

FIGURE 6
INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES IN AIM

Source: London Stock Exchange 346
Two main areas of focus appear to be the U.S., where listing costs
are deemed too high for small companies, and Asia, where firms are
allured by the promise of cost-efficient access to capital and London’s
prestige. In the U.S., fast-growing companies based in Silicon Valley
are starting to spurn domestic markets for an AIM listing. 347 Table 7
details some of the reasons voiced by U.S. firms listed on AIM.
345. See Press Release, Haynes & Boone LLP, Taking AIM on the London Stock
Exchange (Mar. 16, 2005), http://haynesboone.com/about/pressDetail.asp?pressid=362.
U.S. law firm Haynes & Boone appears to have struck such a deal and is currently
marketing AIM as a viable alternative to U.S. capital markets. The firm’s web page
contains extensive positive information about AIM, and furthermore states that “Haynes
and Boone representatives are available to those journalists interested in exploring the
AIM and its potential.” See id.
346. London Stock Exch., Institutional Advisors on AIM, http://www.londonstockex
change.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/Trade+and+Investin
g/institutionalinvestorsonaim.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
347. See Nicholas A. Vardy, London’s Alternative Investment Market: The New
NASDAQ?, The Global Guru, http://www.theglobalguru.com/article.php?id=63&offer
=GURU001 (last visited Jan 15, 2008).
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TABLE 7
MOTIVATIONS OF AIM-LISTED U.S. FIRMS
MAIN REASONS OF U.S. COMPANIES FOR LISTING IN AIM
Company

Reason for listing

Cyberscan

Access to development capital

Legacy Distribution

Avoid costly US regulation

Prometheus

Achieve greater liquidity

Elcom International

Access capital unavailable in the US

Intermap Technologies

Gain an international shareholder base

Gatekeeper Systems

Facilitate expansion into Europe

OCZ

Remove inefficient financing

Numerous

Provide exit to venture capital investors

Source: AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note
115, at 3.
Although AIM does offer these firms multiple advantages, certain
restrictions still apply to U.S. companies. For instance, in accordance
with Rule 903 of Regulation S, these firms may only escape U.S.
regulation if they abstain from direct selling efforts in U.S. territory.348
Such regulation also becomes applicable to AIM-listed firms if their
investor base exceeds 300 U.S. shareholders or 500 shareholders

348. See Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, supra note 219, at 7
(detailing the so-called “Issuer Safe Harbor” provision).
[A]n offer or sale of securities by the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective
affiliates, or any person acting on behalf of any of the foregoing, shall be deemed to
occur outside the United States within the meaning of Rule 901 if: (i) The offer or sale
is made in an offshore transaction; (ii) No directed selling efforts are made in the United
States by the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective affiliates, or any person acting
on behalf of any of the foregoing; and (iii) The conditions of paragraph (b) of this
section, as applicable, are satisfied.
Id.
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altogether. 349 In Asia, Chinese companies have shown great interest in
joining AIM. Of the twenty-five Chinese firms reportedly listed on
AIM, a majority spurned local and U.S. exchanges, though on different
grounds. 350 Other Asian companies have also successfully listed on
AIM. 351
The increasing number of international companies raises some
concern as to the possibility of offshore vehicles listing on AIM for no
good business purpose. 352 Despite the multiple safeguards laid down by
the exchange to prevent abuses (such as Nomad oversight, lock-ins, and
compulsory use of raised funds), scandals and anomalies already
comprise parts of AIM’s recent past. 353 Although AIM proved to be a
highly responsive regulator, it remains to be seen whether its particular
system of self-regulation can take the strain of an increasing number of
non-U.K. based companies. Thus far the results appear to be mixed. A
survey conducted of AIM investors shows that the venue’s performance
could have been negatively affected by the poorer quality of companies
coming to the market during 2006. 354 Analysts argue, however, that the
2006 slowdown was due to market euphoria, which created unduly high
expectations and gave way to an onslaught of new listings, some of
which may have been mispriced. 355 In any case, some preventive
349.
350.

See id.
See Smart Young Firms Find a Home on AIM, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
June 10, 2006, available at http://www.chi-med.com/eng/media/pdf/news060610.pdf.
NASDAQ was considered too costly, Singapore’s exchange was deemed to be focused
only on manufacturing companies, Hong Kong was excluded since investors apparently
mostly deal in the securities of large companies, and local venues were considered to be
overregulated. Id.
351. See Sundeep Tucker, Listing on London’s Aim Bears Fruit For Asian Citrus,
FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at 3, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=as
ian+citrus&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070530000424&ct=0. Asian Citrus, for instance,
raised nearly £12 million (about $20 million). Its issuance has been proclaimed as a
success for the company, whose CEO described AIM as well organized and teeming
with sophisticated institutional investors. Id.
352. See James Moore, Brokers Sound Alarm over U.S. Threat to AIM, THE
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_qn4158/is_20061114/ai_n16845272. Market players are particularly wary of
newly-listed Russian and Chinese companies. See id.
353. See Business: AIM Changes, supra note 334, at 1. At one point, AIM had to
suspend trading of securities issued by a number of cash shells which had raised public
equity and subsequently refrained from undergoing any business activities. See id.
354. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 7.
355. See id.
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measures were taken in response, including the new Nomad rulebook,
which elevated the hurdles for admittance to AIM. 356
The aforementioned liquidity constraints also impede AIM’s
ambitions. Although liquidity ratios appear to exponentially increase on
a yearly basis, AIM still lacks sufficient trading volume to fully support
larger companies or a fully-fledged venture capital market. 357
Companies that reach the later stages of their growth cycles will surely
require enhanced levels of trading liquidity if they are to remain listed
with AIM. For these firms, liquidity is vital in determining the price
shock that can be absorbed by a particular security during trading. 358
Conversely, start-ups value liquidity, particularly at the IPO stage, as the
venture capitalists that back them often wish to exit their investment
positions, yet still wish to ensure sufficient liquidity to promote further
growth. 359 The European Venture Capital Association believes that
venture-backed firms require a truly pan-European market. LSE’s
purported acquisition of the Borsa Italiana 360 and the removal of barriers
to cross-border capital flows in the European Union can be seen as
initial steps towards AIM becoming such a trading platform.

356.
357.

See supra Part III.B.1.
See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 3. However, AIM is rapidly
maturing beyond its initial status as “nursery” to the Main Market, such that some of
AIM’s largest companies have not even considered listing in the U.K.’s Official List.
Id.
358. See Fulfilling the Promise of Venture-backed High Potential Companies
(European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, Brussels, Belgium), Oct.
2005, at 3. This notion of price shock refers to the impact on share price of events that
alter the demand or supply of a given stock, such as investors selling shares or the
exercise of management options. A highly liquid stock with a daily trading volume of
$1 billion will be able to absorb a $100 million shock with “little or no market impact.”
Id. A company with less liquid stock can see its share price negatively affected by a
comparatively lower market shock. See id.
359. See id. Other reasons include “[generating] sufficient trading commissions to
support high quality sellside research coverage, . . . the orderly sale of venture capital
positions to efficiently replace them with capital from institutional and retail investors.”
Id.
360. See LSE Borsa Deal ‘Will be Approved,’ BBC NEWS, June 25, 2007, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6236284.stm. Both exchanges have recently
agreed to a $2 billion merger in which Borsa Italiana shareholders would receive LSE
shares. Although the transaction must still be approved by shareholders, the LSE’s
directors are confident that it will be completed successfully. Id.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Concurring events after the turn of the twenty-first century have
allowed AIM to sway in its favor the market for small high-growth
firms. Its unique model, based on customized compliance and selfregulation, has made it possible for this segment of the London Stock
Exchange to thrive where others have failed. AIM’s timing was
impeccable; when regulatory costs were being raised on both sides of
the Atlantic after notorious corporate scandals and the bursting of the
technology bubble, AIM stood by its low-cost, high-standards
philosophy. In so doing, it supplied cost-efficient access to large pools
of liquidity in order to meet an increasing demand from companies
which could no longer list in the booming small-cap markets of the
1990s.
AIM’s regulatory model balances investor protection and
compliance costs. Its companies benefit from comply-or-explain rules
which set low hurdles for listing and few ongoing obligations, as
compared to other stock exchanges. AIM regulation can be fine-tuned
to better fit a firm’s distinct traits. On the flipside, listed companies are
severely constrained from embracing poor standards of disclosure and
corporate governance. AIM’s investor base is largely composed of
sophisticated institutional investors that maintain close ties with the
companies in which they invest. Correspondingly, they would be
reticent to pour resources into an enterprise that failed to meet certain
benchmarks.
More importantly, the exchange has partially delegated its
regulatory authority to the so-called Nominated Advisers; namely,
private firms that supervise and provide counsel to AIM firms. Not
unlike thespians, Nomads play multiple roles as gatekeepers, advisers,
and regulators of AIM. Nomad performance is driven by a unique
incentive structure in which their reputational capital is pledged as a
proxy for a firm’s suitability to AIM, its accuracy of ongoing disclosure,
and its quality of internal governance structures.
Despite this trade-off between light regulation and investor
protection, AIM’s model is not without flaws. Some of its smaller
companies fail to meet profit forecasts. Cash shells under the guise of
investment companies have abused the market. Liquidity appears to be
constrained. A few public companies have been fined or censured for
grave misconduct, while others have imploded under shady
circumstances. Nevertheless, AIM has shown to be a highly responsive
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regulator. It has addressed gatekeeper failure by issuing a new set of
guidelines for Nomads, which enhance disclosure by requiring all listed
firms to establish websites with relevant company information. It has
also barred valueless cash shells from the market. Still, AIM needs to
improve considerably in a number of areas. If it intends to mature into a
deeper market and appeal to larger, international firms, it must fix its
liquidity problems. As it attracts more retail investors and non-U.K.
based firms, it will surely have to tighten its rules. While AIM’s
continued ability to adjust to the ever-changing financial environment
remains to be seen, the balance appears to be favorable for the venue’s
innovative model.

